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The Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, through counsel, replies to respondents'
briefs as follows:
ARGUMENT
I.

THE AIR QUALITY BOARD ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DIVISION OF
AIR QUALITY'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER CO? AND OTHER
GREENHOUSE GASES,
Carbon dioxide must be included in BACT analysis under the applicable Utah

regulation, and because greenhouse gases, including C0 2? are subject to regulation.
A.

AQB Plainly Erred in Failing to Apply the Correct BACT Regulation When
Considering Greenhouse Gases.
The Utah Air Quality Board ("AQB" or "Board") erred when, in 2007, it relied

upon the pre-2007 Best Available Control Technology ("BACT") regulation that required
reduction of "each pollutant" rather than the then-current version, which requires
reduction of "each air contaminant." Compare Utah Admin. Code ("UAC") R307-101-2
(current through Dec. 2005) with id R307-401-2 (2007). It is the "long-standing
traditional rule" that evolving legal standards apply to cases on appeal. State v. Saunders,
1999 UT 59, TJ 53, 992 P.2d 951 (applying new court decision both prospectively and
retrospectively); State v. Belgard, 615 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1980) (u[A]n appellate
court must apply the current law rather than the law as it existed at the time the lower
court acted.") (quoting United States v. Fitzgerald, 545 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1976)). In this
case, AQB was effectively adjudicating the appeal of the initial appeal of the initial
approval order ("AO") issued by the Utah Division of Air Quality ("DAQ").

This issue is properly raised on appeal under the plain error doctrine: (1) the error
was plain because, inter alia, the new rule was promulgated by the AQB itself; and (2)
the error caused harm insofar as the respondents rely on the old rule to avoid any
obligation to reduce emissions of millions of tons of greenhouse gases over the life of the
proposed plant.
No respondent contests that Sierra Club is harmed by the error. Sevier Power
Company ("SPC") responds only that Sierra Club fails to establish plain error. This
conclusory statement is unsupported either by legal authority or argument. Compare
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). As such, it is inadequately briefed and the contention "may be
disregarded or stricken." Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
AQB concludes - without "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
record relied upon," Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) - that use of the old rule was proper
because it had a property interest in the initial AO. This claim not only is inadequately
briefed, it is also wrong. The initial AO did not create vested rights. It never became an
"effective" or "final" order because it was timely challenged pursuant to UAC R307-1033. The initial AO, therefore, constituted a preliminary determination subject to challenge,
review and modification, not reliance. See UAC R307-103-6 (defining parties permitted
to intervene precisely for purpose of challenging such preliminary determinations); 40
C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(6)(iv) (Title V permit, which SPC must obtain to operate, is not property
right). AQB's conclusory response addresses none of these arguments set forth in Sierra
Club's opening brief at 20-21. AQB's use of the old rule constituted plain error and
caused harm.
2

B.

AQB Erred Even Under the Old Rule Because Carbon Dioxide
Is Regulated.
The old version of Utah's BACT definition upon which the Board relied parallels

the federal Clean Air Act, requiring BACT for "each pollutant subject to regulation under
the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah [ACA]." UAC R307-101-2 (2005); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7475(a)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50)(iv). The SPC permit must
include a BACT emission limit for carbon dioxide because it is a pollutant subject to
regulation under the Clean Air Act.
Carbon dioxide has been regulated under the Clean Air Act since 1993, when
EPA adopted regulations implementing Section 821 that require monitoring,
recordkeeping and reporting of C0 2 emissions by certain sources. See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k
note; Pub. L. 101-549; 40 C.F.R. § 75.1 et seq. On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court
held that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are "pollutants" under the Clean Air
Act. Massachusetts v. EPA, - U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1460 (2007). Now having been
definitively ruled a pollutant, C0 2 is accordingly a regulated pollutant under the Act,
and the PSD permit must include a C0 2 BACT emission limit.
1.

This argument was preserved.

Sierra Club's opening brief, at 22-24, establishes that C0 2 is indeed "regulated,"
and thus was "subject to regulation" by AQB even under the old rule. SPC claims Sierra
Club did not preserve for appeal the argument that C0 2 monitoring and reporting
regulations constitute regulation.

3

This issue was clearly preserved in the Sierra Club's Consolidated Opposition To
Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings, SPC 2866-2981, where Sierra Club stated that
"The Supreme Court will issue its ruling [in Massachusetts v. EPA] this spring, and the
Board should anticipate the possibility of a decision requiring future regulation of
greenhouse gas pollutants from coal-fired power plants." SPC 2897-98.l

In arguing

that C0 2 was a pollutant subject to regulation, Sierra Club's opposition memorandum
declared:
Further, the Clean Air Act specifically includes carbon dioxide in a list of
"air pollutants." Section 103(g) [of the CAA] directs EPA to conduct a
research program concerning "[improvements in nonregulatory strategies
and technologies for preventing or reducing multiple air pollutants,
including . .. carbon dioxide, from stationary sources, including fossil fuel
power plants." The Clean Air Act requires regulation of air pollutants that
"may reasonably be anticipated to endanger human health or welfare." The
statutory definition of "welfare" specifically includes effects on climate and
weather.
SPC at 2898 (notes omitted). The issue, moreover, was sufficiently presented to permit
the AQB to rule upon it (albeit erroneously). SPC 4695-96 (rejecting arguments that C0 2
was subject to regulation).
2.

CO2 is an air pollutant subject to regulation.

The first post-Massachusetts decision as to whether a BACT analysis is required
for C0 2 emissions ruled that it is. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. v. Longleaf Energy

1

On April 3, 2007, Sierra Club submitted its Consolidated Notice of Supplemental Authority,
informing the Board of the Massachusetts ruling, and asserting: "The Court's determinations is
important because Sierra Club alleges in its Requests for Agency Action that carbon dioxide and
nitrous oxide are air pollutants subject to regulation under the Clean air Act and Utah [ACA],
and must be considered when developing these permits." SPC 3061-62.
4

Assoc, Docket No. 2008CV146398, 13-14 (Super. Ct. Ga. June 30, 2008) ("Longleaf").2
A copy of Longleaf is attached hereto as Addendum A. The Georgia court held "[pjutting
aside the argument that any substance that falls within the statutory definition of 'air
pollutant' may be 'subject toj regulation under the Act, there is no question that C0 2 is
'subject to regulation under the Act.'" Id, at 6-7. The court relied, inter alia, upon
precisely the C0 2 monitoring provisions respondents herein seek to discredit. Id. at 7
(citing 40 C.F.R. Part 75).
Intervenor Pacificorp advances the same argument that the Longleaf court
rejected. It advocates a narrow definition of the term "regulation" that includes only
those regulations requiring "control" of emissions, by which it means restrictions or
limits on emissions quantities. Pacificorp Br. 21. Thus Pacificorp contends that C0 2 is
not subject to regulation under the CAA because the regulations required by section 821
do not constitute "regulation" within the meaning of section 165(a)(4) since they do not
cap C0 2 emissions. As the Longleaf court recognized, this position is untenable. Id.
When Congress adopted the PSD provisions of the Clean Air Act in 1977, it
required a BACT emission limit "for each pollutant subject to regulation under this
chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). When it amended the Act in 1990, it required EPA to
"promulgate regulations" requiring monitoring and reporting of C0 2 emissions. 42
U.S.C. § 7651k note. Those regulations rendered C0 2 "subject to regulation" under the
Act and therefore subject to BACT. Congress used the same word in both provisions,
2

On Aug. 20, 2008, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that it would review the
Longleaf decision. See http://www.gaappeals.us/docket/results_one_record.php7docr__
case_num=A08D0472 (Georgia Court of Appeals website indicating appeal granted).
5

and the strong presumption is that the word means the same thing in both instances.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Lundv. 516 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1996).
Monitoring and reporting requirements clearly constitute regulation. Longleaf at
7-8; cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (record keeping and reporting
requirements are regulation of political speech). Carbon dioxide emissions are subject to
monitoring, so they therefore are subject to regulation. Just like regulations restricting
emissions quantities, the regulations EPA promulgated implementing Section 821 have
the force of law, and violation results in severe sanctions. 40 C.F.R. § 75.5; 42 U.S.C. §
7113(c)(2) (punishable by imprisonment of up to six months or fine of up to $10,000 for
making false statement or representation or providing inaccurate monitoring reports
under Clean Air Act); see Longleaf at 7 (monitoring regulations enforceable by criminal
sanction). Indeed, EPA has enforced section 821 in a number of consent decrees that
require the installation of C0 2 monitoring equipment. See Add. B (Excerpt of Exh. 1 to
EPA Region VIII and Office of Air and Radiation Supplemental Brief, In re Deseret
Power Electric Cooperative, PSD Appeal No. 07-03, EAB).
In support of its argument that Congress intended "regulation" to mean only a
restriction on emissions quantity, Pacificorp notes that Black's Law Dictionary defines
"regulation" as "[t]he act or process of controlling by rule or restriction." So it does. But
Congress explicitly used the word "regulation" in Section 821 to refer solely to

6

monitoring and reporting requirements. Moreover, "control" is not synonymous with
"limit" or "restrict."3
Pacificorp also argues that the phrase "subject to" requires control of emissions.
Br. 23-24. A pollutant, however, can be "subject to" monitoring just as easily as it can be
"subject to" emissions limitations: both are forms of regulation. Contrary to Pacificorp's
contention, the pollutant emissions, not the facilities or sources, are subject to
monitoring. A regulation affects facilities in the same manner whether it requires
emissions limitations or emissions monitoring: just as facility operators must install
equipment to limit emissions, so must they install equipment to monitor emissions.
a. The Structure of the CAA Favors a Broad Interpretation of "Regulation. "
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court noted that Congress deliberately used broad
language in the Clean Air Act to render it flexible enough to avoid future obsolescence as
a result of changing circumstances and scientific developments. — U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. at
1462. Pacificorp's narrow interpretation of the term "regulation" contravenes the U.S
Supreme Court's admonition to give full effect to the broad language of the Act.4

3

Black's defines "control" as "the power or authority to manage, direct, or oversee."
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Monitoring and reporting regulations certainly
constitute oversight.
4
Pacificorp apparently derived this interpretation from an internal 1993 EPA memo
justifying a narrow interpretation of "pollutants subject to regulation under the Act"
based on the mistaken belief that Congress did not intend to regulate C0 2 . See Lydia N.
Wegman, Definition of Regulated Air Pollutant for Purposes of Title V, Memo to Air
Division Director, Regions I-X (Apr. 26, 1993), at 4-5. In concluding that C0 2 was a
pollutant, however, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected that exact agency rationale, i.e.,
EPA's mistaken belief that Congress did not intend it to regulate greenhouse gases.
Massachusetts v. EPA, -- U.S. --,127 S.Ct. at 1460. In the wake of Massachusetts, any
EPA regulatory treatment of C0 2 based on the rationale that Congress did not intend
7

The Act's PSD provisions apply to a broader range of pollutants than do the Act's
emissions limits provisions. Pacificorp's arguments miss this fundamental distinction.
Congress explicitly stated the purpose of the PSD program: to "protect public health and
welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in the Administrator's
judgment may reasonably be anticipate^] to occur from air pollution . . . ,
notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of all national ambient air quality
standards." 42 U.S.C § 7470(1) (emphasis added). In contrast, Congress was equally
explicit in requiring EPA to make an endangerment finding before establishing generally
applicable standards such as the NAAQS, New Source Performance Standards, or motor
vehicle emissions standards. Unlike the PSD program, each of these programs expressly
requires EPA to find that emissions of a pollutant "cause or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare" as a
prerequisite to regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1); see also
42 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1).
Thus Congress - which was familiar with the "endangerment trigger" deliberately established a much lower threshold for requiring BACT than an
"endangerment finding." Requiring BACT for "each pollutant subject to regulation
under the Act" meshes perfectly with the PSD program's purpose to guard against "any .
regulation of C0 2 is no longer valid. Nor does the Cannon memo provide support for
Pacificorp's interpretation. See Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, EPA, EPA's
Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power Generation Sources, Memo
to Carol M. Browner (April 10, 1998). While the Cannon memo states that "the
Administrator has not yet determined that C0 2 meets the criteria for regulation under one
or more provision of the Act," id. at 4, it does not speak to whether Congress had made a
determination to regulate C0 2 . Clearly, Congress has done so by adopting Section 821.
8

.. potential adverse effect," as opposed to endangerment of public health or welfare.
Pacificorp ignores this distinction in arguing that EPA's failure to make an endangerment
finding in the context of the motor vehicle emission standards at issue in Massachusetts
v. EPA means that C0 2 is not subject to regulation. See Pacificorp Br. 27, 29. No
endangerment finding is required before BACT can be applied to C0 2 .
This lower threshold for triggering BACT makes perfect sense, because BACT is
not a generally applicable standard, but rather involves a case-by-case analysis.
Requiring BACT analysis does not prejudge the outcome by mandating a particular
emissions limit. Rather, the Act requires balancing of "energy, environmental, and
economic impacts and other costs" in the BACT analysis, providing a mechanism for
implementing the purpose of the PSD program. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). As a result, BACT
analysis can be applied to emissions that Congress and EPA have not yet otherwise
elected to restrict, in a manner that is cost-effective, consistent with the limits of available
technology, and appropriate in light of environmental and energy implications.
Respondents claim that the BACT process is not suited to address C0 2 emissions
because EPA has not yet set limits on greenhouse gas emissions. This argument ignores
the function of BACT within the PSD program: to achieve the "maximum degree of
reduction" of air pollutants specifically including C0 2 that are "achievable" through use
of available and affordable means. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1990); 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(12);
UACR307-101-2.
In fashioning the PSD program, Congress imposed varying PSD requirements
depending upon the status of the pollutant; all regulated pollutants were controlled to
9

some extent, while those regulated under certain specific provisions of the Act were
subjected to a more rigorous level of analysis and control. For example, while sections
165(a)(4) and 165(e)(1) apply to "each pollutant subject to regulation" under the Act,
section 163 applies only to pollutants subject to maximum allowable increases
(particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides). 42 U.S.C §§ 7473, 7475. Thus,
Pacificorp is wrong in arguing that BACT applies only to pollutants with maximum
allowable increases or maximum allowable concentrations. See Pacificorp Br. 22 n.9.5
Similarly, Pacificorp erroneously suggests that the reference in section 169(3) to
new source performance (section 111) and hazardous air pollutant (section 112) standards
indicates an intent to limit BACT to pollutants subject to emissions controls under some
other provision of the Act. IdL The language of section 169(3) belies this assertion. The
first sentence provides a definition of BACT to be applied broadly to "each pollutant
subject to regulation under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). The second sentence
ensures that employing the BACT standard defined in the first sentence does not result in

5

BACT clearly applies to sulfuric acid mist, for example, which has no maximum
allowable increments or concentrations. 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80240 (Dec. 31, 2002).
Pacificorp ignores a similar distinction between sections 165(e)(1) and 165(e)(2) and
inappropriately conflates those two subsections. See Pacificorp Br. 22 n.9. Section
165(e)(1) applies broadly, like BACT, requiring an air quality analysis "for each
pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter which will be emitted from such
facility." Section 165(e)(2) is more narrow, requiring air quality monitoring only for
pollutants with maximum allowable increases or maximum allowable concentrations. 42
U.S.C. § 7475(e). See Alabama Power v. Costle. 636 F.2d 323, 371-72 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(holding that section 165(e)(2) requires monitoring for NAAQS pollutants, but section
165(e)(1) requires only "analysis" for pollutants subject to regulation under Act). Thus,
it is perfectly consistent with the statutory structure to subject emissions of various
pollutants to different PSD requirements.
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a violation of section 111 or 112 for any pollutants to which those provisions apply,
including not only the pollutant subject to that BACT analysis, but also any other section
111 or 112 pollutant. It serves the dual purpose of ensuring that (1) controls for one
pollutant do not raise emissions of other pollutants above levels allowed by sections 111
and 112; and (2) the flexibility inherent in the BACT standard does not result in
emissions levels for any pollutant that violate those other standards. It simply ensures
consistency among the statutory provisions. Finally, the phrase "any applicable
standard" implies that no section 111 or 112 standard may apply. LI
In sum, while certain PSD provisions state that if there is a limit set, then
emissions may not exceed that limit, they do not link the "maximum . .. achievable"
degree of reduction to that limit. In other words, the maximum limits merely set the
ceiling, while BACT requires pollution control to be as far below that ceiling as is readily
achievable. Where, as here, there is no maximum limit for C0 2 yet established, the law is
clear: Do the best you can.
b. The EPA Regulation Implementing Section 165 Requires BACT for CO^
As the Longleaf court noted, interpreting "regulation" to mean limits on the
quantity of emissions is inconsistent with the EPA's regulatory definition of air pollutants
that require BACT. Longleaf at 8. The court noted that the EPA defined a "regulated"
pollutant to include "any pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act."
Id at 8-9 (quoting 40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(50)(iv)). The court declared:
Limiting BACT determinations to those air pollutants for which there is a
separate, general numerical limitation effectively ignores part (iv) of the
regulation that sweeps in all pollutants that are "otherwise subject to
11

regulation under the Act." Since C0 2 is "otherwise subject to regulation
under the Act," a PSD permit cannot issue for Longleaf without C0 2
emission limitations based on a BACT analysis.
Id. at 9 (citations omitted). The broad language of EPA's regulation, like the broad
language of the Clean Air Act, clearly encompasses pollutants that are subject to
monitoring and reporting regulations.
Pacificorp points to a list of pollutants in the preamble to the final rule
promulgating, inter alia, the definition of "regulated NSR pollutant" and argues that this
list constitutes the entire universe of pollutants subject to regulation under the Act.
Pacificorp Br. 21 n.8. Yet neither the preamble, nor the rule, nor the original notice of
proposed rulemaking indicate that this list is intended as a comprehensive and exclusive
catalogue of pollutants subject to PSD permitting. See 67 Fed. Reg. 80186, 80240 (Dec.
31, 2002); 61 Fed. Reg. 38250, 38310 (July 23, 1996). The list appears in a section of the
rulemaking titled "Listed Hazardous Air Pollutants" that addressed which hazardous air
pollutants would continue to be subject to PSD requirements in light of the 1990
amendments to section 112. 67 Fed. Reg. at 80240; 61 Fed. Reg. at 38309-11. The list,
however, excludes PM2.s, a pollutant that most certainly is subject to limits on the
quantity of emissions. Because PM2.5 is clearly a "regulated NSR pollutant," its absence
demonstrates that the list is not comprehensive.
Pacificorp also claims that the preamble to the 1978 PSD regulations somehow
limits the pollutants that are now subject to regulation under the Act. Pacificorp Br. 22.
The 1978 preamble, however, merely described the statute as it existed at that time, and
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in no way limits pollutants that may have subsequently become subject to regulation
under the Act due to statutory amendments.
c. A Narrow Reading of "Regulation " Conflicts with D. C Circuit Precedent.
The D.C. Circuit's holding in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 403
(D.C. Cir. 1979), foreclosed the narrow reading of the phrase "each pollutant subject to
regulation" that Pacificorp espouses. In Alabama Power, industry groups challenged
EPA regulations implementing the newly-enacted PSD provisions, arguing that BACT
applied only to sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. The court upheld EPA's regulation
that, as characterized by the court, "applies PSD and BACT immediately to each type of
pollutant regulated for any purpose under any provision of the Act, not limited to
sulfur dioxide and particulates." Id (emphasis added). The court declared that the
phrase "each pollutant subject to regulation" should be read broadly:
The only administrative task apparently reserved to the Agency . . .
is to identify those . . . pollutants subject to regulation under the Act which
are thereby comprehended by the statute. The language of the Act does not
limit the applicability of PSD only to one or several of the pollutants
regulated under the A c t . . . .
Id. at 404. Although this decision predates the enactment of Section 821, the D.C.
Circuit's reasoning behind its holding that BACT applies "immediately to each
type of pollutant regulated for any purpose under any provision of the Act," id. at
403, applies to the subsequent enactment of statutory provisions that subject
additional pollutants to regulation, such as Section 821. The court's rationale
compels the conclusion that BACT applies to C0 2 .
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The Environmental Appeals Board cases on which Pacificorp relies do not
contradict the conclusion that C0 2 is subject to regulation under the Act. In In re
Inter-Power of New York, Inc., 5 E.A.D. 130 (EAB 1994), the Board's
perfunctory comment that C0 2 was an "unregulated pollutant" was correct as
applied in that case, because petitioners were challenging a permit that had been
issued before EPA regulated C0 2 by adopting the section 821 monitoring rules. 5
E.A.D. at 131; see 58 Fed. Reg. 3701 (Jan. 11, 1993). In In re Kawaihae
Cogeneration Project, 7 E.A.D. 107 (EAB 1997), petitioners did not argue that
C0 2 is regulated under the Act or that the PSD permit should have included a C0 2
BACT emission limit, so the Board did not reach the merits of the C0 2 regulation
issue. 7 E.A.D. at 132.
3.

CO2 is subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act

Section 821 is unquestionably part of the Clean Air Act. The monitoring,
reporting and recordkeeping requirements it imposes are inextricably tied to the
framework in section 412 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k.
Section 821 is an intrinsic and enforceable part of the Clean Air Act. In enacting
section 821, Congress commanded EPA to promulgate binding regulations requiring all
Title V sources to "monitor carbon dioxide emissions according to the same timetable as
in section [412](b) and (c)" and report that data to the Administrator. 42 U.S.C. § 7651k
note. Congress explicitly made these requirements enforceable under the Clean Air Act
by mandating that the "prohibition" provisions of section 412(e) "shall apply for the
purposes of this section in the same manner and to the same extent as such provision
14

applies to the monitoring and data referred to in section [412]." Id. (emphasis added).
Section 412(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for the owner or operator of any source subject to this
subchapter to operate a source without complying with the requirements of this
section, and any regulations implementing this section.
42 U.S.C. § 7651k(e). Congress clearly intended section 821 to be an enforceable part of
the Act.
In keeping with that congressional purpose, EPA has consistently treated Section
821 as a part of the Clean Air Act. The regulations implementing Section 821 explicitly
state that a [a] violation of any applicable regulation in this p a r t . . . is a violation of the
Act." 40 C.F.R. § 75.5(a). The regulations implementing Section 821 are the same
regulations that implement Section 412 of the Act. They state:
The purpose of this part is to establish requirements for the monitoring,
recordkeeping, and reporting of sulfur dioxide (S0 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and
carbon dioxide (C0 2 ) emissions, volumetric flow, and opacity data from affected
units under the Acid Rain Program pursuant to Sections 412 and 821 of the
CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q as amended by Public Law 101-549 (November
15,1990) [the Act].
40 C.F.R. § 75.1(a) (emphasis added). The proposed rule noted that it "establishes
requirements for the monitoring and reporting of C0 2 emissions pursuant to Section 821
of the Act." 56 Fed. Reg. 63,002, 63,291 (Dec. 3, 1991) (emphasis added). Subsequent
rulemaking proceedings referred to these regulations as "the 'core' regulations that
implemented the major provisions of Title IV of the Clean Air Act (CAA or the Act),
as amended November 15, 1990, including . . . the CEM regulation at 40 CFR part 75
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authorized under Sections 412 and 821 of the Act." 60 Fed. Reg. 26,510 (May 17,
1995) (emphasis added); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 42,509 (Aug. 18, 1994).
Significantly, EPA has enforced section 821 requirements pursuant to the
enforcement authority conferred by section 113 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413. See Add.
B. Moreover, the requirement to monitor C0 2 is included in Title V permits, which are
issued under the Clean Air Act. See, e^g., Add. C (Title V Operating Permit No.
3500068002, at 13, Nov. 29, 2004) (permit issued by DAQ for Pacificorp plant in Salt
Lake City: "The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NO x and C 0 2 as required by 40 CFR Part 75
for the Acid Rain Program.")
Pacificorp erroneously asserts that Section 821 is not part of the Act because it
was codified as a note, and because a compilation of the Act published by a House
committee after its enactment implied that Section 821 did not amend the Act. "[T]he
fact that [a] provision was codified as a statutory note is of no moment." Conyers v.
Merit Svs. Prot. Bd., 388 F.3d 1380, 1382 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In the specific context of
the Clean Air Act, the D.C. Circuit unhesitatingly categorized a note to 42 U.S.C. § 7502
as being "in the Act." New York v. EPA.. 413 F.3d 3, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added) (reviewing EPA's interpretation of New Source Review permitting process for
stationary sources under CAA). 6
The characterization of Section 821 in a subsequent House Energy and Commerce
6

Because § 821 is inextricably intertwined with § 412, the lack of an express statement
within the former that it amends the Act does not undermine the conclusion that is part of
the Act.
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Committee publication7 has no bearing on whether Congress intended it to be part of the
Clean Air Act. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "'the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.'"
Massachusetts v. EPA, -- U.S. --, 127 S.Ct. at 1460 n.27 (quoting United States v. Price,
361 U.S. 304, 313 (I960)). "[P]ost-enactment legislative history is not only oxymoronic
but inherently entitled to little weight." Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
The law is clear, as are respondents' BACT obligations: A permit for the new
plant must ensure that C0 2 and other greenhouse gas emissions are minimized to the
"maximum .. . achievable" degree possible. Neither the law, nor the State of Utah's
environment, sanctions any further delay.
II.

DAP ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER IGCC IN THE SPC
BACT ANALYSIS.

A.

IGCC Must Be Considered Because BACT Requires Consideration of Any
Technology Allowing the "Emitting Facility" to Emit Less Pollution.
Each respondent posits that Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle ("IGCC") is a

power generating technology, not a pollution control technology. This distinction is
insignificant, because Congress intended BACT to apply to "emitting facilities," and both
the coal-fired plant proposed by SPC and an IGCC coal-fired plant are within the same
class of "emitting facilities." See Longleaf, at 13-14 (BACT explicitly requires analysis
7

See House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Compilation of Selected Acts within
the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 451-52 (Comm. Print,
2001), available at http://epw.senate.gov/cleanair.pdf. Section 821 appears under the
heading "Provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Public Law 101-549)
That Did Not Amend the Clean Air Act."
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and permit emission limitations based on "emitting facility" as whole); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7479(3). Contrary to respondents' contention, employing IGCC would not redefine the
scope of the project; it is simply an alternative production process, and must be
considered under B ACT.
Four definitions are vital to understanding the error respondents perpetuate in their
briefs. First, no one disputes that IGCC is a "production process" as that term is used in
the BACT definition. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3); see also SPC 4670; AQB Br. 22. Second,
Congress classified together all "fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants" as one discrete
class of "major emitting facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). Third, this discrete category
not only includes the coal plant SPC initially proposed, but also coal-fired IGCC plants:
IGCC electric utility steam generating unit means a coal-fired electric
utility steam generating unit that burns a synthetic gas derived from coal in
a combined-cycle gas turbine. No coal is directly burned in the unit during
operation.
40 C.F.R. § 60.4IDa; see also id. (conversely, "[c]oal-fired electric utility steam
generating unit means an electric utility steam generating unit that burns coal, coal refuse,
or a synthetic gas derived from coal either exclusively, in any combination together, or
in any combination with other fuels in any amount" (emphasis added)). In other words,
whether SPC builds a coal-fired plant as initially planned, or a coal-fired IGCC plant, the
plant would still be within the same "fossil-fuel fired steam electric plants" class of
"major emitting facilities."
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Finally, and most significantly, Congress intended BACT analysis to be applied
not merely to a power generating source, i.e., a boiler or turbine, but rather to the "major
emitting facility" itself:
The term "best available control technology" means an emission limitation
based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to
regulation under this chapter emitted from or which results from any major
emitting facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other
costs, determines is achievable for such facility through application of
production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques,
including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel
combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant.
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (emphasis added). AQB's obligation, therefore, is to require SPC to
identify production processes by which the proposed major emitting facility will
maximize pollution control. Requiring analysis of IGCC production process would not
even require stepping outside the same class of emitting facilities SPC initially proposed.
See Longleaf at 14 (holding that "[t]he ALJ erred in ruling that IGCC would 'redefine the
air pollution source' so that it need not be part of the BACT analyses").
AQB's so-called factual findings, with which each respondent seeks to accredit the
AQB's legal conclusion that IGCC need not be considered, are irrelevant because the
legal conclusion itself is flawed. The findings merely support AQB's erroneous legal
conclusion that IGCC constitutes a different "source." Because IGCC and SPC's coal
plant are defined as being in the same category of sources, or emitting facilities,
interchanging the different processes does not redefine the source. IGCC, in fact, must
be considered as BACT because it might allow SPC's proposed major emitting source to
reduce pollution over its 40 to 50 years of operation.
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Neither respondent has so much as hinted what harm mere consideration would
impose. If installing IGCC turns out to be unachievable "taking into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs," then at least we are assured that
the best available control technology really will be used. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).
B.

IGCC Is "Available,"
Each respondent addresses the availability issue by emphasizing its expert's

testimony. This emphasis is misplaced. The expert testimony is based upon a definition
of "available" so narrow as to eviscerate the term's meaning as well as the very purpose
of BACT. "Available" must include those processes that are "potentially" available,
those that have been used in different industries, and those that have been employed at
home and abroad. U.S. EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual at B.l 1 (Draft Oct.
1990) ("NSR Manual") ("Applicants are expected to identify all demonstrated and
potentially applicable control technology alternatives.") See Add. D. "The term
available is used in its broadest sense under the first step [of BACT analysis] and refers to
control options with a 'practical potential for application to the emissions unit' under
evaluation." In re Knauf Fiberglass, 8 E.A.D. 121, 130 (EAB 1999) (quoting NSR
Manual). Instead of following the NSR Manual's clear directive, the AQB effectively
defines "available" as only including that technology already available off the shelf on
aisle nine at Home Depot. See SPC 4699-701.
IGCC technology is unquestionably "available" as it has been employed in at least
four plants designed to use coal, ranging in size from 192 MW to 298 MW, two of which
are in the United States. See SPC 3558-59 (Profiled Test, of J. Thompson, Aug. 31,
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2007). Additionally, there currently are at least 130 gasification projects in operation
worldwide, fourteen of which use IGCC technology. IGCC coal-burning plants have
successfully operated around the world since 1994, and more and larger plants using
IGCC are in construction or proposed in Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington and West Virginia. See SPC 3560-61.
IGCC technology clearly is available, as these projects evidence.
The fundamental purpose underlying BACT is to compel "rapid adoption of
improvements in technology as new sources are built." S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 29 (1977);
SPC 3585-86. This technology-forcing philosophy was "fundamental" to Congress's
adoption of the BACT requirement and efforts in the 1977 amendments "to accentuate
technological innovation in the control of air pollutants." Id. at 10. Congress plainly saw
the goals of the Clean Air Act are best served by requiring BACT analysis for a broad
range of available technologies. Even if further analysis fails to show that IGCC is
BACT for SPC, such analysis will identify IGCC's current shortcomings for further
industry and regulatory innovation. Absent this constant drive for maximum control of
air pollution, fostered by the BACT process itself, the Act will not achieve the
technological advancements that Congress envisioned. IGCC therefore should be
included in the BACT determination for SPC.
III.

THE NITROUS OXIDES BACT DETERMINATION WAS
UNREASONABLE.
BACT determinations must be "reasonable" and must be based on statutory and

regulatory factors. Alaska Dep't of Envt'l. Cons, v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 485, 500-502

21

(2004). Reasonable BACT decisions must be "made with fidelity to the [Clean Air]
Act's purpose to 'insure that economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the
preservation of existing clean air resources.'" I d at 485 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3)).
The purpose of BACT is to achieve "the maximum degree of reduction of each",
regulated pollutant. UAC R307-101-2 (2005) (emphasis added). BACT should yield
"the highest air cleaning efficiencies and the lowest pollution discharges." See Add. E
(Utah State Implementation Plan ("SIP") § VII(D)(2) (2006)).
DAQ's BACT decision was unreasonable: it was based upon findings of fact that,
when viewed in light of the whole record, were not supported by substantial evidence.
Harken SW Corp. v. Utah Bd. of Oil Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996)
("Substantial evidence" is "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate
to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."). As this Court held, "[W]e will
not sustain a decision which ignores uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence to the
contrary." Id

This Court faces the same inquiry that was before the United States Supreme Court in
Alaska Pep't: whether, based on the record and the applicable law, the state agency's
BACT determination for NO x was reasonable. 540 U.S. at 494. Importantly, and in
contrast to AQB's contention that Sierra Club must demonstrate BACT, the Court
nowhere required petitioner EPA to show what BACT was. Id at 500-01. The Court
further noted that, on remand, ADEC could still prepare an appropriate record supporting
the agency's original BACT selection. Id. at 501. The Court thus concluded that as long
as ADEC's decision was properly supported by the record, it could come to the same
BACT determination as it previously had. Id
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The record amply demonstrates that DAQ's BACT decision was unreasonable.9
DAQ analyst Mr. Jenks failed to perform the necessary analysis for the BACT
determination that served as the basis for DAQ's permitting decision. First, DAQ
adopted its BACT limit from its applicant SPC, which passed it along from a vendor, and
adopted that limit with limited review, repeating SPC's assertions and copying its charts.
SPC 1031-35. Second, DAQ based its entire BACT analysis upon the Clearinghouse,
while ruling out from its analysis: (1) different sized plants; (2) plants that did not burn
coal; (3) performance tests and actual emissions for currently operating CFBs; 4) control
strategies for reducing boiler-out NO x emissions; and (5) plants with different averaging
periods. SPC 4704. As a result, DAQ's BACT limit - which supposedly reflects current
maximum achievable emission reductions - is based entirely on two 1998 permits and
several even older than that.10
DAQ's post hoc attempts to justify its decision fail to overcome the insufficiency
of its original analysis. For example, AQB asserts that DAQ's BACT determination is
supported by its finding that 0.10 lb/MMBtu 24-hour NO x limit and 0.07 lb/MMBtu 30day average limit are "statistically comparable." SPC 4704. However, while no evidence
in the record supports this finding, the finding itself is not relevant to the present inquiry

9

To deflect attention from the foundational unreasonableness of its BACT decision, AQB
erroneously claims Sierra Club bears the burden to "prove that a more stringent emission
limit was BACT." AQB Br. 30. Sierra Club has no such obligation. See Alaska Dep't
540 U.S. at 500-01.
10
DAQ's own expert admitted the Clearinghouse is backward-looking and agreed that a
BACT analysis should be based on more than a search of this database. Trial Tr., vol. 4,
658, Oct. 1, 2007. DAQ allegedly also relied on web searches and reviews of other
sources, SPC 4703-04, but such research is not in the record.
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- whether DAQ's BACT determination was reasonable - because Mr. Jenks testified that
his original analysis considered plants with 30-day averages not comparable to SPC's
proposed plant. See SPC 4729:173 (comparing 30-day to 24-hour average limit is like
comparing "apples and oranges"); SPC 4729:190 ("different averaging periods mean that
the two permit limits are completely different").
Likewise, AQB's reliance on the testimony of Ms. Conger and Mr. Campbell is
unavailing. Ms. Conger based her analysis on one non-CFB plant with a 0.12 lb/MMBtu
30-day average permit limit, and her testimony demonstrated only that the plant was not
meeting a 0,12 lb/MMBtu 24-hour average emission limit, which in no way supports
AQB's contention that 0.10 lb/MMBtu 24-hour NO x limit and 0.07 lb/MMBtu 30-day
average limit are "statistically comparable." Mr. Campbell's testimony is similarly
misplaced, in that none of his assertions are based on actual data that appears in the
record. Such assertions -without basis or data in the record - cannot adequately support
DAQ's original BACT decision and do not demonstrate that the decision was reasonable.
Such an approach is tantamount to letting assertions that lacked basis in the back door as
the foundation for what must be a reasonable decision. Moreover, AQB ignored
competent and credible evidence, based on actual use data, presented by Dr. Sahu,
including results of performance tests for JEA Northside and AES Puerto Rico, SPC
4929,4903.
Because DAQ's original NO x determination was based on insufficient analysis in
the first instance, it was unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence. The
Board's post hoc attempts to justify its flawed BACT decision fail to provide the requisite
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evidence, and ignore credible relevant evidence. Therefore, AQB's NO x BACT limit
should be vacated by this Court.
IV.

THE BOARD WAS WRONG TO RELY ON THE SILS POLICY.

A.

The SILs "Policy" Required Rulemaking.
Because DAQ's Significant Impact Levels ("SILs") "policy" was not the subject

of rulemaking, it is unlawful and invalid.11 Contrary to AQB's unsupported assertion,
SILs is a written interpretation of both state and federal legal mandates, and is thus
subject to rulemaking.12 See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-201(3) (rulemaking required when
agency "issues a written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate"). In arguing an
"exception" to the rulemaking requirement applies to SILs, AQB utterly fails to address
the relevant statutory subsection. This failure is fatal to AQB's argument: even if SILs
were merely "advisory, informative, or descriptive," to be exempt from rulemaking as
ABQ claims, it would also have to "not conform to the requirements" of §63G-3-201(3),
which as a "written interpretation of a state or federal legal mandate," it demonstrably
does. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-3-201(4)(c); id § 63G-3-201(3) (emphasis added).13

11

Contrary to respondents' assertion, DAQ's exemption of the SPC plant from Class I
increment analysis is a legal determination reviewed for correctness and accorded no
deference by this Court. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006
UT74119, 148 P. 3d 960.
Utah law mandates that DAQ "must" review every new major source to determine
whether it will cause or contribute to an increment violation and in doing so, "shall take
into account all allowable emissions of approved sources . .. whether constructed or not."
R307-405-6(2) (2005, amended 2008). Likewise, federal law mandates that no major
source "may be constructed . . . unless" it demonstrates that it "will not cause, or
contribute to" a PSD increment violation. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (2006).
13
Likewise, AQB utterly fails to address the analysis in C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime
Victims' Rep., 966 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (following Williams v.
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AQB's contention that SILs is a "screening device" or "guidance" that is
"advisory, informative, or descriptive" ignores the Board's own characterization of SILs
as a hard-and-fast rule, allowing no exception: "[I]f a source models below the SILs,
then the analysis is deemed complete." SPC 4714.
Likewise, DAQ applied SILs like a rule: It declared that because modeled
concentrations for SPC were less than SILs, "no further analysis was required." SPC
1027. There was no weighing of factors, no evaluation of recommendations, no
consideration of suggestions, and no discussion as to whether or how SILs should apply
to SPC. SPC 1027, 2526-27. Rather, DAQ made its determination - that "no further
analysis was required" - under the SILs "rule," a rule that is invalid due to DAQ's failure
to follow proper rulemaking procedure.
Further, DAQ's adoption of SILs without rulemaking precluded public comment
SILs' efficacy and levels. Because the SILs "rule" was not properly subjected to
rulemaking, it is invalid as a matter of law. AQB was wrong to rely upon the invalid
SILs rule to exempt the SPC plant from cumulative Class I PSD increment analysis. As a
result, the agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the law.

Utah Pub. Serv. Comm., 720 P.2d 733 (Utah 1986)) (requiring rulemaking when (1) an
agency's policy is generally applicable; (2) the policy interprets law; and (3) the policy
alters clearly established law). In the instant case, SILs is generally applicable, as it
applies to "any new major source or major modification." SPC 0995a. Furthermore,
SILs interprets state and federal law, namely 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3), UAC R307-4056(2), and 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(58)(c). SILs also changes the law: Prior to its adoption,
DAQ required new sources to undertake cumulative Class I increment analysis;
afterward, pursuant to SILs, the agency did not require this analysis. Thus, Utah law
required rulemaking regarding SILs.
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B.

SILs Violates Utah Administrative Code R307-405-6(2).
In addition to being an invalid "rule" under Utah law, SILs conflicts with the plain

language of UAC R307-405-6(2), which states that DAQ "must" determine whether a
new "source will cause or contribute to a violation of the maximum allowable increases"
or PSD increments. UAC R307-405-6(2). DAQ "shall take into account all allowable
emissions of approved sources or modifications whether constructed or not, and, to the
extent practicable, the cumulative effect on air quality of all sources and growth in the
affected area." Id. (emphasis added). The "main purpose" of this "required" air quality
analysis "is to demonstrate that new emissions emitted from a proposed major stationary
source . . . in conjunction with other applicable emissions from existing sources . . . will
not cause or contribute to a violation of any .. . PSD increment." See Add. E (SIP §
VIII(D)(1)). Thus, under the plain language of the controlling rule, DAQ is strictly
obligated to determine the total impacts the new source will create together with the
emissions from all approved sources in the area.
AQB appears to argue SILs somehow deems modeling sources that contribute to
concentrations below SILs as impracticable and therefore modeling in these situations is
not warranted. AQBBr. 41. This argument lacks merit. Nothing in the record supports
DAQ's contention that when the contribution of a source to increment is below SILs,
cumulative increment analysis is somehow not practicable. See, e.g. SPC 4289-90.
Indeed, DAQ attempts to rely on both SPC's and the National Park Service's ("NPS")
cumulative Class I increment analyses, thereby evidencing the agency's opinion that such
analysis actually is quite feasible. Moreover, no connection exists between the
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contribution a facility makes to increment consumption and the practicability of
undertaking cumulative Class I increment analysis, and AQB refers to none.
C.

Properly Determining Increment Consumption Is Not Trivial.
As a key part of the regulatory scheme that protects air quality in our National

Parks, properly determining increment consumption - the heart of cumulative Class I
increment analysis - is not, as AQB suggests, a pointless exercise. First, UAC R307405-6(2) and the SIP both require DAQ, without exception, to determine whether a
source will cause or contribute to an increment violation by taking into account all
allowable emissions of approved sources. See UAC R307-405-6(2); see also Add. E (SIP
§ VIII(D)(1)). The Clean Air Act requires state implementation plans to contain
"measures assuring that maximum allowable increases over baseline concentrations [i.e.,
increments] ... shall not be exceeded'' 42 U.S.C. § 7473(a) (emphasis added). Plainly,
the law does not consider the analysis a trivial pursuit. Moreover, both EPA and NPS
requested that, notwithstanding SILs, DAQ require cumulative Class I increment
analysis.14 Finally, even a small contribution to concentration of pollutants in a Class I
area can consume a significant portion of the remaining increment. For example, as EPA
notes, SPC's own analysis shows that 83.2% of the 24-hour and 53.2% of the 3-hour S0 2
Class I increment at Capitol Reef National Park will be consumed once the SPC facility
begins to operate. See SPC 4303. Thus, even according to SPC's own calculations, the

14

See SPC 0983 (NPS "is very concerned with the rapid development of new coal-fired
power plants in the vicinity of [Utah's] five Class I parks); SPC 4303 (EPA comments:
"Potentially overlapping ambient impacts of multiple pending energy projects should be
considered.").
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new facility will consume, all on its own, 21% of the remaining 24-hour S0 2 Class I
increment.
D.

Sierra Club Has Suffered Substantial Prejudice.
AQB is wrong to claim that Sierra Club has not shown the substantial prejudice

required by Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4) (renumbered 2008) (formerly § 63-46b16(4)). If meaningful review is precluded by an agency's own action, the error is
prejudicial and reversible, and any doubts as to prejudice are resolved against the agency.
See Adams v. Board of Rev, of Ind. Comm., 821 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
(recognizing "substantial prejudice inherent" in commission's failure to make adequate
findings); Angell v. Board of Rev, of Ind. Coram., 750 P.2d 611, 613 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). Because DAQ adopted SILs and failed to conduct its own analysis, it is
impossible to know, as AQB claims, that a proper analysis would have made no
difference to its permitting process. AQB's own failure has precluded review of its
unperformed analysis, and the substantial prejudice required by § 63G-4-403(4) is
inherent in its actions.
V.

DAO'S RELIANCE ON SPC'S ANALYSIS IS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.
Not only is DAQ's post hoc dependence on the SPC sulfur dioxide (S0 2 )

increment analysis unreasonable because the agency in no way based its permitting
decision on the modeling, the analysis itself is legally insufficient because it fails to
15

83.2% of 5 (ig/m3 (24-hour S0 2 Class I increment) equals 4.16 |ig/m3 minus SPC's
contribution (.177 |ug/m3) equals 3.98 |ug/m3 - the current concentration of S0 2 modeled
at Capitol Reef. Therefore, SPC's contribution (.177^g/m3) equals 21 % of the remaining
increment .84 |ig/m3 (5 ^g/m3 - 4.16 |ig/m3). SPC 0280.
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protect air quality at our National Parks. SPC s short cuts include the use of SILs, the
failure to include Hunter 1, the failure to model air quality as of SPC s startup date, the
reliance on annual averages, and the dependence on extra-record modeling and analysis.
The regulatory scheme fails to comply with UAC R307-405-6(2) (2005) and therefore is
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. AQB's reliance on this inadequate modeling
should be vacated.
A,

No Evidence Supports Excluding Hunter 1.
Only if construction on Hunter 1 commenced before January 6,1975 should

emissions from the plant be exempt from cumulative S0 2 Class I increment analysis.16
AQB provides no evidence to show construction on the plant commenced before January
6, 1975. As a result, the plant's emissions must be modeled in cumulative Class I
increment analysis.
AQB asserts Exhibits 12 through 18 support SPC's exclusion of Hunter 1 from its
cumulative analysis. AQB Br. 45. However, Exhibits 14, 15 and 16 merely address
whether construction on Hunter 1 commenced before June 1,1975, the relevant date for
requiring a PSD permit. No exhibit cited by AQB even mentions January 6, 1975, much
less provides evidence that construction of Hunter I commenced before that date. The
Board focuses on Exhibit 13, in which EPA offers several factors to consider in
16

"Emissions of sulfur oxides . . . from any major emitting facility on which construction
commenced after January 6, 1975, shall not be included in the baseline and shall be
counted against the maximum allowable increases in pollutant concentrations". 42
U.S.C. § 7479(4) (Supp. I 1977); Alabama Power, 636 F.2d at 376-77 ("[EJmissions of
sulfur dioxide . . . from major facilities on which construction began after January 6,
1975, are not grandfathered into the baseline but rather count against the increments").
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determining construction commencement prior to the June 1, 1975 PSD permit date, but
says nothing specific to any plant, including Hunter 1, regarding the relevant January 6,
1975 construction commencement date. Nor does any exhibit or testimony in the record
apply or make findings with regard to the Exhibit 13 factors. Thus, there simply exists no
evidence that construction commenced on Hunter 1 prior to January 6, 1975.
In light of the only evidence in the record that actually establishes when
construction commenced on Hunter 1 - SPC 4808 (construction began in March 1975)
and SPC 4809 (applying the CAA definition of "commence construction" stating
contracts executed February 27, 1975; on-site construction work commenced on or about
April 29, 1975) - the Board erred in failing to require the inclusion of Hunter 1 in
cumulative Class I increment analysis.17 Compare SPC 4328-4334.
B.

The Record Refutes AQB's Finding that IPP Unit 3 Was Not Required To Be
Included.
Pursuant to the Utah Administrative Code, DAQ "must" determine "as the

source's projected start-up date," whether a new major source will cause or contribute to
a violation of PSD increments by, inter alia, taking "into account all allowable emissions
of approved sources or modifications, whether constructed or not[.]" UAC R307-4056(2) (2005). The AQB concedes that "IPP Unit 3 received its approval order before the
predicted Sevier Power start-up date." AQB Br. 48. Thus, under the plain language of
17

AQB's inference from EPA's alleged silence regarding DAQ's failure to include
Hunter 1 in its cumulative Class I increment analysis that EPA tacitly supported this
failure is not well taken. By applying its invalid SILs rule, DAQ exempted SPC from
such analysis, so no analysis existed upon which EPA could comment. Indeed, EPA
commented that cumulative Class I increment analysis was missing and should be
included. SPC 1129.
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the rule, IPP Unit 3, as an "approved source" as of the predicted start-up date for the SPC
facility, should have been included in the increment analysis.
AQB argues that "the inventory of increment-consuming sources used for a
cumulative analysis only includes sources that are approved at the time the analysis is
performed." This argument finds no support in rule or law and is contrary to the rule's
plain language. AQB Br. 49; see Archer v. Bd. of State Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d
1142, 1145 (Utah 1995) ("Statutes and administrative rules should generally be construed
according to their plain language."). Nothing in UAC R307-405(6)(2) supports AQB's
assertion, and its interpretation would read the phrase "as of the source's projected startup date" out of the rule and replace it with text found nowhere in the rule. See Thomas
Edison Charter School v. Retirement Bd., 2008 UT App 221,111, — P.3d — ("It is [the
appellate court's] duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force and
effect" (citations omitted)).
C.

The Board Cannot Rely on NPS Cumulative Class I Increment Analysis.
The Board's repeated suggestions that it properly relied upon NPS cumulative

Class I increment analysis are misleading and without merit. AQB Br. 40, 47-48, 49, 50.
The NPS analysis was not complete: its modeling covered only the 24-hour average S0 2
increment, and therefore says nothing about compliance with the equally significant 3hour and annual average increments for S0 2 . See SPC 4311. Therefore, AQB may not
rely on NPS data to imply that modeling for 3-hour and annual increments that included
Hunter 1 and IPP 3 was performed. Furthermore, there is no evidence that DAQ
reviewed the NPS analysis prior to, or even after, its permitting decision. The only
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evidence regarding the NPS analysis is a letter from the agency saying it was done. See
SPC4305-17.18
D.

Reliance on SPC's Cumulative Class I Sulfur Dioxide Increment Analysis Is
Unreasonable Because SPC Underestimated Its Short-Term Impacts.
Because SPC's analysis fails to guarantee compliance with the law, DAQ's

reliance on that analysis is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and should not be
upheld by this Court. To protect our National Parks and other Class I areas, Congress
established three increments for S0 2 - the 3-hour, 24-hour and annual average
increments. 42 U.S.C. §7473(b)(l); UAC R307-405-4. If the 3-hour and 24-hour
increments are exceeded at a Class I area more than once a year, an increment violation
exists and the law is violated. 42 U.S.C. § 7473(a); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c). As a result,
prior to permitting a source, DAQ must guarantee, using cumulative analysis, that the
source will not cause or contribute to a S0 2 increment violation. UAC R307-405-6(2); 42
U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3).

Moreover, DAQ's categorical rejection of contemporaneous NPS increment modeling
analysis casts doubt on AQB's embrace of NPS cumulative impact modeling. Director
Heying completely rejected NPS modeling showing the SPC facility would exceed Class
I S0 2 SILs: "I don't know how they made that determination. The Park Service has never
provided the input data, the met data that they used to determine that number. They - it's
not been subject to public review." Trial Tr. vol. 3, 369-70, Oct. 3, 2007. Reasoning that
led DAQ to snub NPS SILs modeling requires it to likewise reject the NPS cumulative
Class I increment modeling - DAQ did not rely on the modeling to make its permitting
decision, did not make the modeling part of the record, did not open it to public or EPA
review, and did not evaluate the modeling itself, including the "input and met data."
DAQ cannot randomly pick and choose among NPS modeling runs, rejecting one but
embracing the other as it suits the agency. Such unreasoned action is arbitrary and
capricious.
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DAQ failed to meet its obligation by relying on SPC's cumulative analysis. That
analysis improperly attempts to determine compliance with short-term (3-hour and 24hour) increments using long-term annual average emission rates for Utah's existing
sources. As Dr. Milford unequivocally testified, use of annual averages to calculate
impact on short-term increments underestimates the level of increment consumption in
Utah's National Parks.19 SPC 3198. Utah's increment-consuming sources frequently
emit S0 2 pollution at rates significantly higher than their annual average rates over the
shorter time periods protected by the 3-hour and 24-hour average S0 2 increments, and
several sources will emit S0 2 at these higher rates at the same time. Modeling
performed with annual average emissions rates masks these frequent higher emission
rates and therefore understates them. Id Such understated rates fail to provide an
accurate picture of the overall impacts, which is why the law requires full analysis.
Nowhere does AQB dispute Dr. Milford's analysis of the emissions data. In fact,
DAQ's witness, Director Heying, testified her analysis led to graphs and charts that were
"exactly" the same as those Dr. Milford produced, and its own modeler testified that
annual emission rates do not accurately reflect 3-hour and 24-hour rates. Trial Tr. vol. 2,
256, 281, Oct.1, 2007; D. Prey Dep. at 51: 9-24; 49-50; SPC 4393. Rather, AQB based
19

Comments on Utah's power plant projects agree almost universally with Dr. Milford's
conclusion that annual averages underestimate impact on short term increment. See, e.g.,
SPC 4349 (EPA regarding IPP 3: "maximum historical short-term emission rates . . . are
considerably higher than the annual average rates" and, for example "the maximum 3hour emission rate for S02 during 2001-2002 was 9 times higher than the annual average
emission rate for [IPP] Unit 2 and 15 times higher for Hunter Unit 3"; concluding
"increment modeling should be revised to use the actual short term emission rates")
(emphasis added); SPC 4312 & fn. 6. (Park Service: analysis should use maximum
actual short-term emission rates for existing sources).
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its findings on three untenable premises: 1) most often, sources emit pollution at rates
close to their annual average rates; 2) rarely will all relevant Utah sources simultaneously
emit air pollution at their maximum short-term average rates; and 3) sources cannot emit
air pollution at their maximum short-term average emission rates all the time. Trial Tr.
vol. 2, 266-69, Oct. 1, 2007. These premises, however, are irrelevant to protecting
increment. Short-term average increments are not meant to protect against what happens,
on average, over the course of months and years, nor are they meant to protect against
what sources do most of the time. That is the role of the annual average increment.
Rather, 3-hour and 24-hour average increments protect against events when, for short
periods of time, one or more sources emit at higher or significantly higher rates than
usual. As Dr. Milford explained:
The time horizon for the [cumulative Class I increment] analysis is the lifetime of
the new facility, which can be 40 years or more . . . . With only one exceedance
allowed per year for the 3-hour and 24-hour increments, the analysis is meant to
provide protection against even infrequent occurrences of elevated air pollution.
SPC 3197.

Thus, the Board's stated grounds fail even to address Dr. Milford's central

thesis that annual averages underestimate impacts on short-term increment because
averaging over a year masks short-term, higher emission rates - smoothes them out - and
thus does not account for them. As a result, the use of annual average S0 2 emissions
relied on by SPC and accepted by DAQ is legally insufficient for guaranteeing that a

20

AQB misconstrues Dr. Milford's testimony. See AQB Br. at 51. Contrary to AQB's
implication, Dr. Milford did not testify that "the question of which emissions to use" was
"unsettled" in any way, because it is not. Dr. Milford's testified merely that the weight of
authority to be given to the North Dakota MOU and the NSR Manual, given the fact that
neither is final agency action, is unsettled. SPC 4172-73.
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source will not cause or contribute to a violation of the short-term average S0 2
increment. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3) (1977). Because the evidence shows that using
annual average emissions fails to satisfy the legal obligation to ensure that short-term
average S0 2 increments are not exceed, any reliance by AQB on SPC's flawed S0 2
increment analysis is entirely unreasonable.
VI.

THE PURPORTED APPROVAL OF THE 18-MONTH EXTENSION WAS
ILLEGAL.
The Board affirmed DAQ's 18-month extension of SPC's OA without any formal

review, notice, public comment or requirement of ongoing B ACT analysis to ensure that
future construction will incorporate all available pollution controls. AQB based its
decision on UAC R307-401-11, since renumbered R307-401-18, which at that time it
interpreted as requiring no formal review, input, or ongoing BACT analysis.
Significantly, the State of Utah now interprets the same language of UAC R307401-18 in line with its federal counterpart, 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2). AQB Br. at 53.
Currently, therefore, both the federal rule and the state rule require continuing BACT
analysis, as well as public involvement, as a condition of not revoking an AO when
construction has not commenced within 18 months of its issuance. Pet'r Br. Add. D.
One reason for the 18-month provision, according to a current Utah DAQ official,
is to "ensure that major emitting facilities . . . are constructed in accordance with
reasonably current pollution control standards and on the basis of current information
regarding the level of air pollution in the locality where the facility is to be located."
Pet'r Br. Add. D. The respondents herein do not address the glaring problem that,
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pursuant to the indefinite extension in this case without public input or requiring formal
BACT analysis, the SPC plant may be constructed years in the future based upon wholly
outdated technology in obvious violation of the letter and spirit of the Clean Air Act's
BACT provisions.
The respondents, moreover, concede the SPC proposal is a "new major stationary
source" subject to 40 C.F.R. § 52.21, which in turn requires prevention of significant
deterioration of air quality (PSD) in areas that already have attained certain air quality
standards, known as "attainment areas." They concede the SPC proposal is subject to 40
C.F.R. § 52.21, including the strict 18-month revocation language in § 52.21(r)(2). They
then offer complex explanations why they are subject to, but not actually bound by, 40
C.F.R. § 52.21, and why they may interpret the extension provision of UAC R307-401-18
far less stringently than 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2).
The respondents' explanations fly straight in the face of two inescapable
regulatory mandates: Rule 52.21 itself, and Utah's State Implementation Plan (SIP).
A.

Rule 52.21, by Its Own Terms, Is Incorporated into Utah's SIP.
Rule 52.21 expressly incorporates itself into every SIP:
(2)(i) The requirements of this section apply to the construction of any new
major stationary source (as defined in paragraph (b)(1) of this section) or
any project at an existing major stationary source in an area designated as
attainment or unclassifiable under sections 107(d)( 1 )(A)(ii) or (iii) of the
Act.
(ii) The requirements of paragraphs (j) through (r) of this section apply to
the construction of any new major stationary source or the major
modification of any existing major stationary source, except as this section
otherwise provides.

40 C.F.R. §52.21(a)(2).
37

Later in the same regulation, exceptions to the application of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 to
state plans are expressly listed. 40 C.F.R. § 52.2l(i). The 18-month provision of 40
C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2) is not excepted. Because the SPC proposal is a major stationary
source, subsection (r)(2) applies to the SPC AO. Subsection (r)(2) presumes revocation
of the SPC AO absent good cause. Pursuant to the DAQ's own interpretation, subsection
(r)(2) requires that any non-revocation and extension of the AO beyond 18-months be
based upon public input and ongoing BACT analysis.
B.

The EPA Previously Amended Utah's SIP, along with Every Other SIP,
to Incorporate the Provisions of Rule 52.21(r)(2).
EPA's very approval of Utah's SIP expressly requires adherence to 40 C.F.R. §

52.21, including subsection (r)(2). 40 C.F.R. § 52.2346 (2003). While respondent SPC's
brief quoted section (a) of the approval regulation, it inexplicably omitted section (b),
which mandates Utah's compliance with 40 C.F.R. § 52.21, including subsection (r)(2):
(a) The Utah plan, as submitted, is approved as meeting the requirements of
Part C, Title I, of the Clean Air Act, except that it does not apply to sources
proposing to construct on Indian Reservations.
(b) Regulation for prevention of significant deterioration of air quality. The
provisions of § 52.21 except paragraph (a)(1) are hereby incorporated
and made a part of the Utah State implementation plan and are
applicable to proposed major stationary sources or major modifications to
be located on Indian Reservations.
40 C.F.R. § 52.2346 (emphasis added).
Respondent AQB's brief, at 60-61, asserts without analysis that 40 C.F.R. §
52.2346(b) only requires adherence to 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 on Indian land. The plain
language of the provision refutes any such interpretation. Section (b) plainly incorporates
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40 C.F.R. § 52.21 into the state plan, and applies the same provisions to Indian land.
This also is consistent with 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(i)-(ii) (quoted supra) that expressly
applies portions of 52.21 to the states, including subsection (r)(2). AQB's interpretation
also ignores that a state generally has no authority to conduct new source review ("NSR")
in Indian country. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (PSD), 68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74485 (Dec. 24, 2003) ("The
Federal government is currently the NSR reviewing authority in Indian country.") AQB's
interpretation is erroneous for four additional reasons based upon 68 Fed. Reg. 74483, et
seq., which amended Utah's SIP in December 2003.
First, the interpretation limiting the 2003 incorporation of § 52.21 merely to Indian
Reservations runs counter to EPA's introductory explanation of the 2003 SIP
amendments. There EPA explains that the SIP amendments are merely making clear
what EPA had previously done, to wit, incorporated Rule 52.21 into every SIP:
The 1978 final rule also incorporated section 52.21 by reference into
the SIPs for 54 programs (50 States, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands,
American Samoa, and Guam) as follows:
(a) The requirements of sections 160 through 165 of the Clean Air Act are
not met, since the plan does not include approvable procedures for
preventing the significant deterioration of air quality.
(b) The provisions of section 52.21 (b) through (v) are hereby
incorporated and made part of the applicable State plan for the State
of.
(see 43 Fed. Reg. 26410).
68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74484 (Dec. 3, 2003) (emphasis added).
Second, EPA further explains that the purpose of the 2003 SIP amendments is to
ensure that any and all future changes to Rule 52.21 will similarly apply to all SIPs:

39

Today's rule differs in one respect from the previous action to revise the
Federal implementation portions of State plans. In the previous rule, we
incorporated the relevant subsection 52.21 by referring to the paragraphs as
"(a)(2) and (b) to (bb).fl The purpose of that reference was to incorporate all
the substantive provisions of 52.21. Today's rule adopts a different
cross-referencing format—"40 CFR 52.21 except paragraph (a)(1)/1
Using this format, the Agency intends for the Federal implementation
plan portions of State plans to automatically update whenever new
sections are added to 52.21.
68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74485 (Dec. 2003) (emphasis added).
Third, the December 2003 amendment to SIPs in states and districts that do not
have an Indian Reservation merely employs the incorporation language to that state or
district and omits reference to "Indian Reservations." For example:
§ 52.499 Significant deterioration of air quality.
(b) Regulations for preventing significant deterioration of air quality. The
provisions of § 52.21 except paragraph (a)(1) are hereby incorporated and
made a part of the applicable State plan for the District of Columbia.
68 Fed. Reg. 74483, 74488 (Dec. 2003). Similar wording as that for the District of
Columbia is also used in states that do not contain Indian Reservations, such as Illinois
and Massachusetts. By omitting reference to "Indian Reservations," the amendments
where there are no Indian Reservations merely make clear that Rule 52.21 is incorporated
into the SIP. For states and districts that do not have Indian Reservations, no amendment
of any kind would be necessary if incorporation of Rule 52.21 were only intended to
apply in Indian Country.
Fourth, that EPA approved Utah's plan as written does not mean it approved
AQB's interpretation of the 18-month provision in a manner that was far less stringent
than the parallel provisions of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(r)(2). The express language of 40
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C.F.R. §§ 52.21(a)(2) and 52.2346(b), and EPA's 2003 explanation of the purpose for
amending the SIP's, including Utah's, prevent any such conclusion.
The Board's closed-door and indefinite extension of SPC's initial AO must be
vacated, and AQB ordered either io revoke the AO, or to subject any extension request to
public input and continuing BACT analysis as required by federal law, as well as by
AQB's current practice.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the Board's decision and remand with instructions to:
(1) Include carbon dioxide and IGCC in its BACT analysis;
(2) Conduct a BACT analysis of NO x that includes relevant and more recent data;
(3) Conduct Class I increment analysis;
(4) Conduct adequate increment analysis of 3- and 24-hour S0 2 emissions; and
(5) Revoke the 2004 AO unless and until SPC updates its plans to include all new
and feasible technology to achieve maximum pollution control.

DATED this A

day of September, 2008.
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41

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the V J

day of September, 2008,1 caused to be delivered

10 copies of the foregoing Petitioner Sierra Club's Reply Brief (one with an original
signature) to the Utah Supreme Court, and delivered via U.S. Postal Service, postage
prepaid, as indicated:
Fred G. Nelson (2 copies)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873
Attorney for the Utah Air Quality Board
Chris Stephens (one copy)
Paul McConkie (one copy)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Assistant Utah Attorney General
150 North 1950 West
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Attorneys for Utah Division of Air Quality
Martin K. Banks (one copy)
Michael G. Jenkins (one copy)
Stoel Rives
PacifiCorp Legal Dept.
201 South Main, Suite 1100
1407 North Temple, Ste. 410
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Salt Lake City, UT 84116
Attorneys for Intervener PacifiCorp
Brian Burnett (one copy)
Fred Finlinson (one copy)
Callister Nebeker & McCullough
Finlinson & Finlinson, PLLC
10 West South Temple, Suite 900 11955 West Fairfield Road
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Saratoga Springs, Utah 84045
Attorneys for Sevier Po\ver Company
Joel Ban (one copy)
Ban Law Office, PC
1399 South 700 East, Suite 3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Attorney for UPHE

James O. Kennon (two copies)
Dick Cumiskey
146 North Main Street, Suite 27
P.O. Box 182
Richfield, UT 84701
Attorneys for Sevier County Citizens for Clean Air and
Clean Water

Tab A

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON C O U N T J ^ f c ^ J M OF r X £ '.
STATE OF GEORGIA
j I
FRIENDS OF THE
CHATTAHOOCHEE, INC. and SIERRA
CLUB,
Petitioners,
v.

Docket No. 2008CV146398

DR. CAROL COUCH, DIRECTOR,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
DIVISION, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Respondent
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LONGLEAF ENERGY
ASSOCIATES, LLC,
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FINAL ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for Judicial Review of the final
decision and other orders of the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) regarding the issuance
of a permit to Respondent Longleaf Energy Associates, LLC (Longleaf) to construct and
operate a 1200 megawatt coal-fired power plant in Early County, Georgia. The plant as
petmitted would annually emit large amounts of air pollutants, including 8-9 million tons
of carbon dioxide; thousands of tons of sulfur dioxide; nitrogen oxides: particulate
matter; sulfuric acid mist; and other hazardous air pollutants, including mercurv.
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Petitioners challenged the permit and the matter was assigned to an ALJ for hearing and
disposition.
Petitioners' First Amended Petition asserted 17 counts set out in great detail in 213
separate paragraphs. Some of those counts were ultimately withdrawn. The ALJ granted
Respondents summary relief on others, and after receiving evidence and argument, the
ALJ dismissed Petitioners' remaining counts and upheld the permit in all regards in a
final decision dated January 11, 2008. The Petition for Judicial Review was timely filed
in this Court The parties submitted briefs and appeared and were heard through counsel
on June 3,2008,
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS COURT
This Court's review of the ALJ's decision is appellate in nature. Children's
Hosp. v. Go, Dep't ofMed Assistance, 235 Ga. App. 697,700 (Ga. App. 1998). The
Petition for Judicial Review presents questions of law, and this Court reviews such
questions de novo. Davis v* Turpmy 273 Ga. 244,246 (2007). A de novo standard also
governs this Courf s review of the ALPs grant of summary determination. Children's
Hosp., 235 Ga. App. at 700.
RULINGS ON THE ISSUES
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C, §§ 7401 et seq. (Act) includes a number of
regulatory programs ^ o protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so
as to promote the public health and welfare and productive capacity of its population . . ,
r 42 U.S.C § 7401(b)(1), The Act is federally administered by the United States
2
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which has promulgated regulations to carry out
the Act and to regulate substances considered "air pollutants.7' Some of those regulations
prescribe National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), which are national limits
for a few particular pollutants. See 40 C.F.R. Pt 50. Many of the regulations under the
Act, however, regulate pollutants under different regimes.
Areas within the United States are categorized as either "attainment areas" or
"non-attainment areas/' An attainment area is one in which the pollution levels are
within all of the prescribed NAAQS limits. Early County is an attainment area. Because
it is an attainment area, the Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration CPSD)
limitations apply, and those require that any new "major emitting facility" receive a PSD
permit and comply with the permit's conditions. Hie administrative review of the PSD
peirnit application is handled by the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the
Georgia Department of Natural Resources.
There is no dispute that the proposed power plant would be a "major emitting
facility" as defined by the Act because it is a 'fossil-fuel fired steam electric plant" of a
size far greater than the statutory threshold 42 U.S.C § 7479(1). The proposed plant
would also emit far more air pollutants than the statutory threshold. Id. Because the
proposed plant would be a "major emitting facility,*3 Longleaf must incorporate the "best
available [pollution] control technology" (BACT), which is defined as follows:
The term "best available control technology'5 means an emission limitation based
on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under
this Act emitted from OT which results from any major emitting facility, which the
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy,
3
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environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for
such facility through application of production processes and available methods,
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or
innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant.
42'U.S.C § 7479(3).
For every "pollutant subject to regulation under the Act/1 the BACT analysis
requires a series of steps from identifying the appropriate technologies to evaluate;
evaluating the comparative effectiveness of those technologies in controlling pollution
emissions; the assessment of other specified considerations; and, ultimately, a decision
concerning which technology is the "best available control technology." The emission
limitations in the facility's permit must be set based on that "best available control
technology/*
Petitioners claim that the permit and the ALJ rulings concerning the application of
BACT to the Longleaf plant are legally erroneous. These contentions relate to three
separate issues — carbon dioxide emissions; particulate matter emissions; and alternative
combustion technology known as IGCC.
*•

THE AJLTS STAJNPARD OF REVIEW

Petitioners also raise several procedural issues that go to the ALJ's substantive
rulings. First, Petitioners assert that the A U erred across the board by failing to make de
novo findings and decisions. The Court has carefully reviewed the final decision of the
ALJ, and it is clear that the ALJ did not make de novofindingsor decisions concerning
emission limitations or other issues. The A U repeatedly rejected contentions of
Petitioners not because the facts did not support the Petitioners* position, but because the
4
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ALJ concluded that EPD's decision was not "unreasonable."1 If the law required the ALJ
to make a de novo decision, the final decision is fatally flawed for failure to do so.
The Court concludes that a de novo decision should have been rendered. Under
the statutory scheme that governs EPD actions like the permitting decision here, the ALJ
sits in lieu of the Board of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). While the DNR
Board would have the plenary authority and responsibility to make a de novo decision,
that authority was transferred by statute to the Office of State Administrative Hearings
(OS AH) and the A U s therein. Under the law as it pertains to this type of challenge, any
person, such as Petitioners, who are "aggrieved or adversely affected by any order or
action of the director [of EPD] shall, upon petition to the director within 30 days after the
issuance of such order and the taking of such action, have a right to a hearing before an
administrative law judge of the Office of State Administrative Hearings ,. > acting in
place of the Board of Natural Resources"

O.CG.A. § 12~2~2(c)(2)(A)(italics added).

The statute goes on to state that "the decision of the administrative law judge shall
constitute the final decision of the board." O.C.GA, § 12-2-2(c)(2)(B).
Not only was the ALJ acting as the DNR board in this case with authority to
determine all aspects of the instant permit de novo, the specific rules of OSAH dictate
that this proceeding should have been determined de novo, OSAH Rule 21(3) provides
3

Typical of the ALTs reasoning is the statement that "the Director's determinations should be
affirmed if they are within the scope of her authority, constitute a reasonable exercise of her
discretion, and satisfy the requirements of law. This tribunal should not substitute its equally
reasonable determination for the Director's reasonable determination." Final decision at 65,
That is not a de novo decision.
5
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that: "The hearing shall be de novo in nature

" OSAH Rule 21(1) further states that

"the ALJ shall make an independent determination on the basis of the competent
evidence presented at the hearing. -. [and] the ALJ may make any disposition of the
matter as is available to the [DNR]-" While the State Respondents contend that this rule
pertains only to the "burden of proof/* that is plainly incorrect It requires a de novo
hearing in clear and explicit language that cannot reasonably be construed otherwise.
The Court has reviewed the abundant authority on this issue cited by the parties.
To the extent that any of those authorities suggest that a "reasonableness" standard has a
place in administrative hearings, they pertain to different situations or statutes where
"reasonableness" is, for example, a specific element of the matter at issue. It is clear
from these authorities that the ALJ should have made a de novo decision in this case, and
the final decision is erroneous in all of its findings and decisions for failure to do so.
H-

EMISSION LIMITATION FOR CARBON DIOXIDE

As to the first of these, carbon dioxide> it is undisputed that no BACT analysis was
done. There was no effort to identify, evaluate, or apply available technologies that
would control CG2 emissions, and the permit contains no C0 2 emission limits.
The ruling of the ALJ can be upheld on this issue only if carbon dioxide is not an
air "pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." Otherwise, the statute requires a
BACT emission limit for C0 2 , The argument had been advanced before the permit
issued here that C0 2 was not an "air pollutant* * under the Act, but that argument was
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct 1438
6
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(2007). Faced with the ruling in Massachusetts that C0 2 is an "air pollutant" under the
Act, Respondents are forced to argue that C0 2 is still not a "pollutant subject to
regulation under the Act" Respondents' position is untenable. Putting aside the
argument that any substance that falls within the statutory definition of "air pollutant"
may be "subject to*' regulation under the Act, there is no question that CO2 is "subject to
regulation under the Act."
Respondents acknowledge, for example, that the regulatory Tegime under the
Clean Air Act mandates monitoring of C0 2 emissions. The failure to conduct required
monitoring under the Act's regulations is subject to criminal sanction, and a person who
knowingly submits false monitoring reports may be subject to a felony prosecution. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C § 7113(c)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 100L Respondents do not dispute that the
failure to comply with these C0 2 regulations is enforceable by criminal sanction.
In addition to the C0 2 monitoring regulations m Part 75 of Title 40 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, Petitioners have provided the Court with many other examples of
Clean Air Act regulations that address C0 2 . Respondents effectively ignore these
regulatory structures by contending that BACT limits should apply to a pollutant only if it
is also capped or controlled by some other general limit Thus, Longleaf argues that C 0 2
is not "controlled or limited" by the Clean Air Act as the basis fox contending that BACT
should not apply. (Longleaf Brief, p. 38). The BACT statute is plainly broader than that,
however^ encompassing all pollutants that are "subject to regulation" under the Act,
whether or not they are independently subject to NAAQS or other general limits. The
7
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ALJ clearly erred, in light of the regulatory schemes that in fact address C02, in stating
that "EPA has not promulgated a [NAAQS] for C02> has not listed CO2 as a regulated
pollutant in any section of the CAA, ami has not established any other regulations for
C02" (Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dec. 4 8,2007, p. 6)(italics added).
If the BACT requirement were limited as Respondents urge, Congress presumably
would have used narrower language in the BACT provision, as it did elsewhere in the
Act. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k)(addressing quantitative "emission limitations"). The
regulatory definition of air pollutants that require BACT determinations is also
inconsistent with Respondents* position. The parties agree that a BACT analysis and
emission limitation is required for all "regulated NSR2 pollutants," 40 CJF,R. §
52.21©(2). The parties also agree that a "regulated NSR pollutant" is defined in EPA's
regulations as follows:
(50) Regulated NSR pollutant, for purposes of this section, means the
following:
(i) Any pollutant for which a national ambient air quality standard has been
promulgated and any constituents or precursors for such pollutants
identified by the Administrator (e.g., volatile organic compounds and NOX
are precursors for ozone);
(ii) Any pollutant that is subject to any standard promulgated under section
111 of the Act;
(iii) Any Class I or II substance subject to a standard promulgated under or
established by title VI of the Act; or
(iv) Any pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act;
except that any or all hazardous air pollutants either listed in section i 12 of
* "NSR'1" refers to "new source review/1
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the Act or added to the list pursuant to section 112(b)(2) of the Act, which
have not been delisted pursuant to section 112(b)(3) of the Act, are not
regulated NSR pollutants unless the listed hazardous air pollutant is also
regulated as a constituent or precursor of a general pollutant listed under
section 108 of the Act.
40CF.R-§52.2I(b)(50).
The interpretation of this regulation urged by Respondents, and accepted by the
ALJ, contradicts the plain meaning of the regulation. Limiting BACT determinations to
those air pollutants for which there is a separate, general numerical limitation effectively
ignores part (iv) of the regulation that sweeps in all pollutants that are "otherwise subject
to regulation under the Act" Since C0 2 is "otherwise subject to regulation under the
Act," a PSD permit cannot issue for Longleaf without CO2 emission limitations based on
a BACT analysis,
EGL

MODELING FOR FINE PARTICULATE MATTER

Petitioners' next contention concerns particulate matter. There are two distinct
forms of particulate matter, each defined by particle size. PM)0 includes all particulate
matter that is 10 microns or less in size. PM2.5 includes all particulate matter that is 2.5
microns or less. See 40 C.FJR. §§ 50.6 & 50.7.
PMiohas long been one of the pollutants for which there has been a national, or
NAAQS, standard. Based on studies concerning the adverse health impacts of very small
particulate matter, the EPA in 1997 also promulgated a separate NAAQS requirement for
PMZ5> See 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652 (July 18,1997), The EPA found the new PM2.5 standard
necessary because of health risks that included "premature mortality and increased
9
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hospital admissions and emergency room visits . , .; increased respiratory symptoms and
disease, in children and individuals with cardiopulmonary disease such as asthma;
decreased lung function, particularly in children and individuals with asthma; and
alterations in lung tissue and structure and in respiratory tract defense mechanisms/' Id.
The PM2 5 NAAQS was made even more stringent in 2006 because of additional healthrisk studies. 71 Fed. Reg. 61,143 (OcL 17,2006).
Because PMZ5 is an air pollutant that is subject to NAAQS, Longieaf was required
to prove that the national PM2.5 standard would not be exceeded as a result of the plant's
construction.
No major emitting facility on which construction is commenced after
August 771977, may be constructed [in any attainment area) unless —"• ..
(3) the owner or operator of such facility demonstrates, as required pursuant
to section 7410(j) of this titls, that emissions from . . . such facility will not
cause, or contribute to, air pollution in excess of any . . . (B) national
ambient air quality standard
(4) the proposed facility is subject to the best available control technology
for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter emitted from, or
which results from, such facility;...
42 U.$.C> § 7475(a).
The dispute here arises over what has been called "surrogate" evaluation of PM2.5
emissions. The so-called surrogate approach uses modeling for PMJO emissions to
examine PM2.5 compliance. EPA "guidance" has been written that allows a surrogate
approach in some circumstances. Petitioners do not contend that the use of a PMI0
surrogate evaluation is never appropriate. For example,, Respondents rely upon an
10
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administrative decision arising from Illinois, In Re Prairie State Generating Company,
PSD Appeal Number 05-05 (EPA Environmental Appeals Board). In that case, PM!0
modeling was used as a surrogate for assessing PM2j> pollution by assuming a worst case
scenario - Le.9 that all particulate matter included within the 10 micron or less range fell
within the 0.0 to 2.5 micron range. Since that worst case analysis showed that the PM2.5
NAAQS would not be exceeded as a matter if fact in Prairie Slate, the surrogate
approach fully answered the legal issue concerning PM2j compliance.
The circumstances here are very different than in Prairie State. Instead of
employing PM10 modeling as a useful worst-case approximation for PM2.5 emissions,
Longleaf made no effort at all to show that the PM2.s NAAQS would be satisfied. Had
the worst-case approach of Prairie State been followed here, it predicted that the PM2.5
NAAQS would be exceeded, in violation of the Clean Air Act Moreover, Petitioners
offered affirmative evidence from their expert who specifically modeled for and
determined the actual PM2 j levels that would occur in the Early County attainment area if
the Longleaf plant were built. He concluded that "modeling of PM2.5 shows
concentrations during normal operations will exceed the 24-hour NAAQS (National
Ambient Air Quality Standards).'* (Tran Affidavit). Nevertheless, the ALJ granted
Respondents7 motion for summary determination on the PM2j issue, concluding that the
PM10 modeling Longleaf performed was sufficient, as a matter of law.
The Court concludes that the ALJ erred The issue here is not whether PMJO
surrogate modeling may or may not be relevant, or even sufficient in some
11
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circumstances. 3 Rather, the issue in this case is whether the decision-maker can ignore
relevant evidence on the issue of whether or not the NAAQS for PM 2 j will actually be
violated. The only actual modeling evidence of P M ^ ^ this record shows that the
proposed facility would exceed the NAAQS for PM 2 ^ in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
7475(a)(3). The ALJ refused to even consider that evidence, and that was error. While
the surrogate approach permits consideration of PM I0 modeling evidence, it does not
allow the ALJ to ignore other relevant evidence.
The approach advocated by Respondents and adopted by the ALJ has no support
in the law. Under that approach, the evidence could show conclusively that the PM2.s
NAAQS would be violated by a proposed facility, but the ALJ would be constrained to
"find" otherwise whenever the PM 10 limit is.satisfied. In effect, that rationale would
repeal the PM2.5 limit. Nothing in either the guidance or the recent EPA publication
allows or requires that result. Ignoring relevant evidence is inconsistent with conducting
a hearing and making findings. It is also inconsistent with the Act's provision that
renders the permit illegal if the plant would cause the NAAQS for PM25 to be exceeded.

The parties dispute certain specifics concerning the meaning of the EPA guidance, and whether
that guidance is consistent with the Act itself. Neither guidance nor regulations, of course, can
contradict the federal statute. Respondents also cite a recent Federal Register publication of a
new EPA rule - which would appear to raise the earlier "guidance" to something like "role
status" - although k appears that the new rule will not go into effect until after this Court's
decision- Given this Court's ruling concerning the PM.2,5 issue, it need not resolve the nuances of
the parties5 arguments concerning when the surrogate approach may satisfy the Act as a general
matter in the absence of other evidence.
12
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IV.

INTEGRATED GASIFICATION COMBINED CYCLE

Petitioners' final argument concerning BACT requirements involves an alternative
^fiiel combustion technique/' The Longleaf plant as proposed would consume coal to
generate electricity. Under Longleaf s proposed design, the coal would be burned in a
boiler; the heat from the boiler would generate steam; and that steam would drive a
turbine, which, in turn, would drive a generator to generate electricity. The IGCC
technology (integrated gasification combined cycle) is a diffetent way of using the coal to
generate heat to drive the turbines. 40 C.F.R. § 60,41 Da. IGCC works by first
converting the coal to a gas ~ called "gasification" - and then burning the gas to drive
turbines both directlyfromthe hot gas and from steam, which again is created by the heat
of combustion. And once again, the turbines drive the generator to create electricity.
Respondents argue that they are not required by the BACT statute and regulations
to do a full analysis of IGCC combustion technology, and that the permit limitations need
not incorporate lower pollution Hmits thai would occur if IGCC were used. Longleaf
advances this argument, which was accepted by the ALJ, by focusing not on the overall
proposed plant, but on just one aspect of the facility. At the hearing, Longleaf argqed
that the legal analysis here should focus only on the proposed toiler," not on the
"facility," which is a much broader term.
Respondents' approach is too narrow and cannot be squared with the provisions of
the law that control the Court's decision on this issue. The BACT statute is explicit in
this regard. It requires a BACT analysis and permit emission limitations based on the
13

Opt-Out: ***

"emitting facility" as a whole. 42 U.S-C § 7479(3). In addition, the statute was amended
in 1977 to require, as part of the BACT analysis, consideration of "innovative fuel
combustion techniques." IGCC is an "innovative fuel combustion technique."
The proposed "major emitting facility* is still the same-kind of statutorily defined
"facility" under the Clean Air Act whether the coal is burned directly in a boiler or is first
converted to gas and then burned to create the heat of combustion that drives the turbines.
The ALJ erred in ruling that IGCC would "redefine the air pollution source" so that it
need not be part of the BACT analyses. (Final Decision, pp. 8-9). Under the statutory
definition, ooe kind of "major emitting facility" is a "fossil-fuel fired steam electric
plant" 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1), With or without IGCC technology, the Longleaf plant thus
falls under the same "facility" definition - a "fossil-fiiel fired steam electric plant" The
regulatory definition supports this conclusion. It provides:
Integrated gasification combined cycle electric utility steam generating unit
or IGCC electric utility steam generating unit means a coal-fired electric
utility steam generating unit that burns a synthetic gas derived from coal in
a combined-cycle gas turbine.
40CF.R. §60.41.Da.
While the statute and regulation are clear on their face, the Court would also note
that the proponent of the 1977 amendment that added the BACT language at issue
addressed this specific question on the Senate floor. In his explanation to the Senate
concemmg the amendment Senator Huddleston explained that while he believed BACT
already included "such technologies as ... gasification,*5 the amendment was added

14
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nevertheless '"to be more explicit, to make sure there is no chance of misinterpretation/'
123 Cong. Rec. S. 9434-35 (June 10, 1977),
V.

THE ALFS SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF COUNTS XIII AND XIV

Petitioners next appeal from the ALTs summary dismissal of Counts XIII and
XIV of their Amended Petition, which challenged as inadequate Longleafs assessment of
the impact of known carcinogens and other toxic emissions on public health and its
assessment of visibility impairments. First Amended Petition, fl[ 177,179, 194. The
ALJ dismissed these claims without hearing evidence because the petition did not include
an allegation of specific emissions limitations that should have been included in the final
permit if the health and visibility studies had been performed appropriately. However, as
alleged in detail and asserted in Petitioners' offer of proof based on the Affidavit of K.
Tran, ^ 22, an appropriate health impact assessment of a plant like Longleaf requires
consideration of many factors, and only after such a study, could appropriate permit
limits be determined. First Amended Petition, ^f 177,179. Petitioners5 complaint
concerning the lack of visibility impact studies included a litany of specific omissions
and inadequacies, and specific allegations concerning the appropriate studies that needed
to be performed as a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit. Id. fj 181-83, 185-86, 18994.
The ALJ's summary dismissal of these counts for failure to include specific permit
limitations was erroneous as a matter of law. The basis of these counts was not the limits
in the permits, but the failure of the applicant to assess the public harm prior to
15
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establishing permit limitations. Under tie ALJ's approach, a person complaining about
the failure of an applicant to perform an assessment would be required - as a prerequisite
to challenging that failure - to folly perform the required studies and then determine
emission levels that would properly protect the public. No rule of pleading can
reasonably impose such a burden on a litigant. Where a petitioner alleges that the
applicant completely failed to do appropriate studies, neither the applicant nor EPD can
claim "harm" by having those allegations heard and determined simply because
petitioners themselves did not first do the studies the respondents failed to do. If the
DNR rule the ALJ relied upon can be construed and applied in this fashion, it is plainly
not authorized by law.
An aggrieved persons right to review EPD's decision is guaranteed by statute.
G.CG.A. § 12-2-2(c)(2XA). To allow for important issues to be precluded by such
pleading contrivances would violate both the spirit and letter of the law that grants
citizens the right to meaningful review. In Georgia, there is a strong presumption of
judicial review of administrative actions. Nix v. long Mountain Resources, Inc., 262 Ga.
506,509 (1992)- Georgia is a liberal pleading state, and especially so in administrative
proceedings. Schaefer v. Clark, 112 Ga. App. 806 (1965). Requiring a litigant to
identify a precise permit limitation as a precondition to judicial review is contrary to
these well-established pleading standards. Moreover, procedural questions arising at any
stage of the proceeding which are not addressed in the Administrative Procedures Act or
any other applicable law shall be resolved at the discretion of the ALJ, who may consult
16
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and utilize the Civil Procedure Act and the Uniform Superior Court Rules in the exercise
of this discretion. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs, 616-l-2-.02(3).
EPD cites general statutory provisions in support of the ALJ's order, such as
0,C.GA. § 50-13-3(a)(2)< That statute allows the department to adopt "rules of
practice/' but nothing in it or any other statute authorizes the kind of rule the DNR relies
on here. The Court of Appeals has addressed the sufficiency of pleadings under this
statute, Georgia PSCv. Alltel Georgia Communications Corp., 244 Ga- App, 645, 648
(2000), and that case demonstrates the error of the ALFs ruling. Alltel upheld the
sufficiency of a notice feat was much less detailed than what was set forth in Counts XIII
and XTV of the First Amended Petition here. Petitioners' pleadings were clearly
sufficient
VI- MOTION TO AMEND PETITION TO ADDRESS THE
PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING LICENSURE STATUS OF EPD
PERSONNEL
Finally, Petitioners challenge the permit because the underlying BACT analyses
by the EPD were not performed by a professional engineer. The AIJ initially ruled that
Petitioners were late in raising this challenge, but went on to rule against Petitioners on
the merits regardless, holding that the absence of a professional engineer did not
invalidate the permit. Since the AU determined the issue on the merits, this Court will
do so as well.
The scope of work that falls within "professional engineering" is specified by
statute, O.C.G.A. § 43-15-2(11), and it includes the kind of work involved in the BACT
17
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analyses here. The purpose of limiting such work to professional engineers is to
"safeguard life, health, and property and to promote the public welfare." O.C.G A. § 4315-1. ^There are some exceptions where peisons may perform engineering responsibilities
where they are not a licensed professional engineer. O.C.GA. § 43-15-29. There is no
such exemption, however, for employees of the EPD doing the kind of work involved in
reviewing the permit at issue here. The Georgia Board of Engineers, which is charged
with enforcing the professional engineering statutes, has ruled that determinations like
those in BACT analyses constitute the practice of engineering.
The parties have provided the Court with no direct authority as to whether an EPD
permit should be invalidated if those persons who made engineering determinations were
not in fact licensed engineers. By analogy, however, there is authority that requires the
invalidation of certain actions taken in the absence of a licensed professional where one
was required Courts have invalidated contracts where the party performing under the
contract was not a licensed professional, but should have been, See, Food Management,
Inc. v. Blue Ribbon Beef Pack Inc., 413 R2d 716,724-25 (8th Cir. 1969)(surveying
decisions). In Georgia, the failure to comply with licensing requirements where they are
imposed not just for revenue purposes, but for public protection, renders a contract void.
Culverhouse v. Atlanta Association for Convalescent Aged Persons, Inc., 127 Ga. App.
574,576-77(1972).
It is important that BACT analyses be performed by competent individuals who
are familiar with the technology. Otherwise, the permit limits may be wrong,
18
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endangering public health. On remand the BPD must utilize sufficient engineering
assistance and direction to ensure that all BACT determinations are done properly and
professionally*
CONCLUSION
Based on this Court's review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the
hearing of June 3, 2008, the final decision of the ALJ entered on January 11,2008 is
hereby REVERSED insofar as it is inconsistent with the rulings of the Court herein, and
it is VACATED in its entirety and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this Order, including a de novo determination of all facts and issues based upon the
record that may ultimately be developed when the omissions and errors specified herein
have been corrected. The ALPs Order on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and the
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment entered on
November 27 and December 18, 2007, respectively, are hereby REVERSED. The ALJ's
Order Denying Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition, for Leave to File a Motion for
Summary Determination, and for Summary Determination Based on Newly-Discovered
Evidence, entered on November 30,2007, is also REVERSED,

So ORDERED this

ELMA WYATT OJMMllSGS MOORE. JUDGE
[/LTON COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
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Exhibit 1: Table of EPA enforcement actions identified by OAR and OECA that arose, in whole or
in part, from the C0 2 monitoring requirements of Section 821 of Public Law 101-549 and/or 40
C.F.R. Part 75, with case documents attached
Enforcement Type
And
Case Name

Administrative
In the Matter oflES
Utilities, Cedar
Rapids, Iowa, Docket
No.VII-95-CAA-lll

General
Violation
Alleged

Enforcement
Authority
Relied Upon

Violations of
the Acid
Deposition
Control
provisions of
Title IV of the
CAA and 40
CFRPart75

CAA§ 113(d)

Summary of Inclusion of
CO2 Requirements in Case
Documents
Complaint generally notes that Part 75
requires continuous emissions
monitoring systems (CEMs) for C0 2
and other acid rain pollutants (ffl[3-5),
states that 40 CFR §75.10(a)(3)
contains the CO2 monitoring
requirements (f 8), and lists specific
C0 2 CEMs violations ( ^ 16-18)
(See p. 3-15 of attached)
Consent Agreement and Consent
Order does not mention CO2, but does
note IES's general compliance with
CAA §412 (f 4) and the Acid Rain
Deposition requirements of CAA Title

iv a 5)
(Seep. 16-21 of attached)
Complaint generally notes the
monitoring and reporting requirements
of Sections 412 and 821 of the Act
( \ 5), notes that Part 75 requires
continuous emissions monitoring
systems (CEMs) for C0 2 and other
acid rain pollutants (1HJ3-4, 34), and
alleges general violations of the Part
75 monitoring and reporting
requirements (ffi[35-36, 45-46)
(See p. 22-36 of attached)

Administrative
In the Matter of
Indiana Municipal
Power Agency,
Carmel, Indiana at its
Anderson Combustion
Turbine Facility,
Anderson, Indiana
and Richmond
Combustion Turbine
Facility, Richmond,
Indiana,
Docket No. CAA-052000-0016

Violations of
Sections 412
and 821 of the
Act and 40
C.F.R. Part 72
and 75

CAA§ 113(d)

—.—.—_

1

Consent Agreement and Final Order
fl[ 2) alleges violations of Sections 412
and 821 of the Act but does not
specifically mention CO2 or any other
Part 75 pollutant1
(Seep. 37-46 of attached)

EPA has been unable to locate a signed copy of the Consent Agreement and Final Order in
Indiana Municipal Power Agency. Attached is an unsigned copy of the document, which was
provided by the Regional Counsel assigned to the matter.
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Enforcement Type
And
Case Name

Exhibit 1 to
OAR and Region Vlll's Supplement Brief

General
Violation
Alleged

Enforcement
Authority
Relied Upon

Violations of
the Acid Rain
Program
requirements of
40 C.F.R. Parts
72 to 78

CAA§ 113(d)

Violations of
Sections 412
and 821 of the
Act and 40
C.F.R. Part 75

CAA§ 113(b)

Violations of 40
C.F.R. Part 75

Sierra Club:
CAA § 304
EPA: CAA §§
304(c) and
113(b)

Administrative
: In the Matter of City
of Detroit,
Department of Public
\ Lighting, Mistersky
Power Station,
I Detroit, Michigan,
Docket No. CAA-052004-0027

Judicial
United States v Block
Island Power Co.,
CA-98-045 (D. R.I.)

Judicial
Sierra Club v Public
Service Company of
Colorado, No. 93-B1749 (D.Colo.)2

Page 2 of 168

Summary of Inclusion of
C0 2 Requirements in Case
Documents
Consent Agreement and Final Order
generally states that the Acid Rain
Program requirements of 40 C.F.R.
Parts 72 to 78 require continuous
emissions monitoring systems (CEMs)
for CO2 and other acid rain pollutants
(ff5-8) and lists general CEMs
violations but does not specifically
mention C0 2 or any other Part 75
pollutant (H 31-35)
(Seep. 47-61 of attached)
Complaint generally states that CAA §
412 and 40 C.F.R. Part 75 require 1
CEMs for CO2 and other acid rain
pollutants fl[ 29) and
alleges a general violation of the Part
75 CEMs requirements (^[49)
(See p. 62-80 of attached)
Consent Decree restates claim
regarding lack of CEMs for C0 2
(1f 5) and requires installation of CEMs
as required by Part 75 flf 25)
(Seep. 81-118 of attached)
Consent Decree fl[ 9) requires
monitoring of CO2 emissions and other
acid rain pollutants in full compliance
with the requirements of Part 75
(See p. 119-168 of attached)

Sierra Club v. Public Service Company of Colorado was a CAA citizen suit in which EPA
intervened. EPA identified this case on an archived administrative enforcement database, and a
plain text copy of the consent decree was the only relevant document from this case that we
could locate.
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Title V Operating Permit
PERMIT NUMBER: 3500068002
DATE OF PERMIT: November 29, 2004
Date of Last Revision: March 6, 2006
This Operating Permit is issued to, and applies to the following:
Name of Permittee:

Permitted Location:

PacifiCorp
1407 W. North Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

Gadsby Power Plant
1407 West North Temple (rear)
Salt Lake City, UT 84116

UTM coordinates: 4,513,486 meters Northing,
SIC code: 4911

421,582 meters Easting

ABSTRACT
The PacifiCorp Gadsby Power Plant is a natural gas-fired electric generating plant consisting of three
steam boilers (Units #1, #2, and #3) and three combustion gas turbines (Units #4, 5, and #6). Unit #1 is a
65 MW unit constructed in 1951, Unit #2 is an 80 MW unit constructed in 1952, and Unit #3 is a 105
MW unit constructed in 1955. Fuel oil may be used in Units #1, #2, and #3 as a back-up fuel during
natural gas curtailments. Units #1 and #2 are equipped with low NOx burners. Three 43.5 MW LM 6000
natural gas-fueled simple cycle gas turbine engines (Units #4, #5, and #6) were added in 2002 and are
subject to New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) Subparts A and GG. The plant is a PM]0 SIP
source located in a PMi0 nonattainment area and an ozone maintenance area. The plant is also a Phase II
Acid Rain source and a major source of NOx and CO.
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II.B.l.d

Condition:
Visible emissions from abrasive blasting operations shall not exceed 40% opacity, except
for an aggregate period of three minutes in any one hour.. [Authority granted under
R307-206; condition originated in R307-206]

II.B.l.d.l

Monitoring:
Visible emission evaluation of abrasive blasting operations shall be conducted at
least quarterly in accordance Provision I.S.I of this permit and the following
provisions:
(a) Visible emissions shall be measured using EPA Method 9. Visible emissions
from intermittent sources shall use procedures similar to Method 9, but the
requirement for observations to be made at 15 second intervals over a six-minute
period shall not apply.
(b) Visible emissions from unconfmed blasting shall be measured at the densest
point of the emission after a major portion of the spent abrasive has fallen out, at
a point not less than five feet nor more than twenty-five feet from the impact
surface from any single abrasive blasting nozzle.
(c) An unconfined blasting operation that uses multiple nozzles shall be
considered a single source unless it can be demonstrated by the owner or operator
that each nozzle, measured separately, meets the emission and performance
standards provided in R307-206-2 through 4.
(d) Visible emissions from confined blasting shall be measured at the densest
point after the air contaminant leaves the enclosure.

II.B. 1 d.2

Recordkeeping:
Results of monitoring shall be maintained in accordance with Provision I.S.I of
this permit.

II.B.l.d.3

Reporting:
There are no reporting requirements for this provision except*those specified in
Section I of this permit.

II.B.2
II.B.2.a

Conditions on Steam Generating Unit #1 (Emission unit #1)
Condition:
Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than 179 lbs/hour and 336 ppmdv (3% 0 2 , dry).
[Authority granted under Utah SIP Section IX.H.2.b.BBB; condition originated in
DAQE-204-02]

ILB.2.a. 1

Monitoring:
a. The permittee shall determine compliance with the NOx limits by calculating
arithmetic average of three contiguous one-hour periods NOx emission rate
(lb/hr) or concentration (ppmdv, 3% 0 2 dry) generated from paragraph b of this
section.
b. The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NOx and C0 2 as required by 40 CFR
Part 75 for the Acid Rain Program. The hourly average 0 2 concentration
(percent by volume) shall be calculated from C0 2 concentration obtained from
C0 2 CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The NOx
concentration (ppm) obtained from NOx CEMS shall be corrected to 3% 0 2 on
hourly basis using the 0 2 data calculated above. The emission rate (lb/hr) shall
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be calculated by multiplying the hourly average NOx emission rate (lb/MMBtu)
by the hourly heat input (MMBtu/hr). The hourly average NOx emission rate
(lb/MMBTU) shall be calculated by using NOx and C0 2 concentrations obtained
from CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The heat input
shall be calculated by multiplying the measured fuel flow rate (scf/hr) by the
hourly average C0 2 concentration (percent by volume) and by any necessary
conversion factors in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F.
c. Each continuous emission monitoring system shall meet the Specifications
and Test Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix A.
d. The permittee shall implement Quality Assurance and Quality Control
Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix B.
II.B.2.a.2

Recordkeeping:
The permittee shall maintain a file of all measurements and calculations,
including continuous monitoring system, monitoring device, and performance
testing measurements; all continuous monitoring system performance
evaluations; all continuous monitoring system or monitoring device calibration
checks; adjustments and maintenance performed on these systems or devices
recorded in a permanent form suitable for inspection.

II.B.2.a.3

Reporting:
The permittee shall comply with the reporting provisions in 40 CFR 75 Subpart
G, and all the reporting provisions contained in Section I of this permit.

II.B.3
II.B.3.a

Conditions on Steam Generating Unit #2 (Emission unit #2)
Condition:
Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than 204 lbs/hour and 336 ppmdv (3% 0 2 , dry).
[Authority granted under Utah SIP Section IX.H.2.b.BBB; condition originated in
DAQE-204-02]

II.B.3. a.l

Monitoring:
a. The permittee shall determine compliance with the NOx limits by calculating
arithmetic average of three contiguous one-hour periods NOx emission rate
(lb/hr) or concentration (ppmdv, 3% 0 2 dry) generated from paragraph b of this
section.
b. The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NOx and C0 2 as required by 40 CFR
Part 75 for the Acid Rain Program. The hourly average 0 2 concentration
(percent by volume) shall be calculated from C0 2 concentration obtained from
C0 2 CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The NOx
concentration (ppm) obtained from NOx CEMS shall be corrected to 3% 0 2 on
hourly basis using the 0 2 data calculated above. The emission rate (lb/hr) shall
be calculated by multiplying the hourly average NOx emission rate (lb/MMBtu)
by the hourly heat input (MMBtu/hr). The hourly average NOx emission rate
(lb/MMBTU) shall be calculated by using NOx and C0 2 concentrations obtained
from CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The heat input
shall be calculated by multiplying the measured fuel flow rate (scf/hr) by the
hourly average C0 2 concentration (percent by volume) and by any necessary
conversion factors in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F.
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c. Each continuous emission monitoring system shall meet the Specifications
and Test Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix A.
d. The permittee shall implement Quality Assurance and Quality Control
Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix B.
II.B.3.a.2

Recordkeeping:
The permittee shall maintain a file of all measurements and calculations,
including continuous monitoring system, monitoring device,.and performance
testing measurements; all continuous monitoring system performance
evaluations; all continuous monitoring system or monitoring device calibration
checks; adjustments and maintenance performed on these systems or devices
recorded in a permanent form suitable for inspection.

II.B.3.a.3

Reporting:
The permittee shall comply with the reporting provisions in 40 CFR 75 Subpart
G, and all the reporting provisions contained in Section I of this permit.

II.B.4
II.B.4.a

Conditions on Steam Generating Unit #3 (Emission unit #3)
Condition:
Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than 142 lbs/hour and 168 ppmdv (3% 0 2 , dry)
from November 1 through February 28 (29). Emissions of NOx shall be no greater than
203 lbs/hour and 168 ppmdv (3% 0 2 , dry) from March 1 through October 31. [Authority
granted under Utah SIP IX.H.2.b.BBB; condition originated in DAQE-204-02]

II.B.4.a. 1

Monitoring:
a. The permittee shall determine compliance with the NOx limits by calculating
arithmetic average of three contiguous one-hour periods NOx emission rate
(lb/hr) or concentration (ppmdv, 3% 0 2 dry) generated from paragraph b of this
section.
b. The permittee shall install, calibrate, maintain, and operate continuous
emission monitoring systems (CEMS) for NOx and C0 2 as required by 40 CFR
Part 75 for the Acid Rain Program. The hourly average 0 2 concentration
(percent by volume) shall be calculated from C0 2 concentration obtained from
C0 2 CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The NOx
concentration (ppm) obtained from NOx CEMS shall be corrected to 3% 0 2 on
hourly basis using the 0 2 data calculated above. The emission rate (lb/hr) shall
be calculated by multiplying the hourly average NOx emission rate (lb/MMBtu)
by the hourly heat input (MMBtu/hr). The hourly average NOx emission rate
(lb/MMBTU) shall be calculated by using NOx and CO? concentrations obtained
from CEMS in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F. The heat input
shall be calculated by multiplying the measured fuel flow rate (scf/hr) by the
hourly average C0 2 concentration (percent by volume) and by any necessary
conversion factors in accordance with 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix F.
c. Each continuous emission monitoring system shall meet the Specifications
and Test Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix A.
d. The permittee shall implement Quality Assurance and Quality Control
Procedures required by 40 CFR Part 75, Appendix B.
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characteristics, to the emissions unit undergoing BACT review.

IV.A.l.

DEMONSTRATED AND TRANSFERABLE TECHNOLOGIES

Applicants are expected to identify all demonstrated and potentially
applicable control technology alternatives.

Information sources to consider

include:
•

EPA's BACT/LAER Clearinghouse and Control Technology Center;

•

Best Available Control Technology Guideline - South Coast Air Quality
Management District;

•

control technology vendors;

•

Federal/State/Local new source review permits and associated
inspection/performance test reports;

•

environmental consultants;

•

technical journals, reports and newsletters (e.g., JAPCA and the
Mclvaine reports), air pollution control seminars; and

•

EPA's New Source Review (NSR) bulletin board.

The applicant should make a good faith effort to compile appropriate
information from available information sources, including any sources
specified as necessary by the permit agency.

The permit agency should review

the background search and resulting list of control alternatives presented by
the applicant to check that it is complete and comprehensive.

In identifying control technologies, the applicant needs to survey the
range of potentially available control options.

Opportunities for technology

transfer lie where a control technology has been applied at source categories
other than the source under consideration.
identified.

Such opportunities should be

Also, technologies in application outside the United States to

the extent that the technologies have been successfully demonstrated in
practice on full scale operations.

Technologies which have not yet been

applied to (or permitted for) full scale operations need not be considered
available; an applicant should be able to purchase or construct a process or
control device that has already been demonstrated in practice.
B.ll
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Utah State Implementation Plan
Section VIII
Prevention of Significant Deterioration
A.

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, Congress added language to the Clean Air Act to prevent significant deterioration of air quality
in areas where the air quality was still pristine. The Act placed a special emphasis on protection of the
nation's national parks and wilderness areas where pristine air is one of the important attributes for
visitors to the area. Areas are designated according to the degree of protection that is needed, and a
baseline pollution level is established. The Act then allows the air quality to degrade only a specified
amount from this baseline level.

1.

Utah's PSD Program.

The State of Utah developed rules and revised the State Implementation Plan to implement the Prevention
of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program as required by the 1977 Clean Air Act (CAA). EPA
approved Utah's PSD program on February 12, 1982. PSD applies to all areas of the State except those
designated as nonattainment under Section 107 of the CAA. PSD permitting requirements apply to all air
pollutants regulated under the CAA. Deterioration of air quality must only be tracked for PMJO, N0 2 and
S0 2 . If an area is designated nonattainment for an air pollutant, PSD may still apply for all other
pollutants.

2.

Nitrogen Dioxide Increments.

On October 17, 1988, EPA promulgated PSD increments for nitrogen dioxide. Utah incorporated the new
increments into the PSD program. These increments apply to all areas within the state designated as
attainment or unclassifiable for nitrogen dioxide under Section 107 of the federal CAA.

3.

PMio Increments.

On November 3, 1995 EPA approved a revision to Utah's PSD program to replace the total suspended
particulate (TSP) increment with a PMi0 increment.

4.

WEPCO Revisions.

On August 19, 2004 EPA approved changes to Utah's PSD program to reflect changes in the federal
regulations (commonly referred to as the WEPCO rule). The changes affected how applicability is
determined for electric utility generating units.

5.

NSR Reform.

On December 31, 2002 the Environmental Protection Agency finalized significant changes to the federal
PSD new source review regulations (this major rulemaking effort is commonly referred to as NSR
reform). These regulations were the subject of numerous challenges, and in 2005 the DC Circuit Court
vacated portions of the NSR reform regulations. In addition, revisions to the NSR Reform regulations to
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clarify the routine maintenance, repair and replacement (RMRR) provisions were promulgated in 2003,
but then stayed by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals on December 23, 2003, pending appeal. Utah's PSD
permitting rule, R307-405, was modified in February 2006 to incorporate the 2002 NSR reform
provisions. The RMRR provisions and the portions of the PSD regulation that were vacated by the DC
Circuit Court were not included in this incorporation pending resolution of the challenges to the
regulation.

B.

AREA DESIGNATIONS

All attainment and unclassifiable areas in the state must be designated as Class I, Class II or Class III.
These designations are intended to establish the amount of air quality degradation that is acceptable for
these areas. Nonattainment areas are not covered under the PSD requirements, but in most cases an area
will only be nonattainment for a few pollutants. In this case, the PSD requirements will still apply for all
other pollutants. R307-405-4 classifies all areas in Utah. These areas are identified below.

1.

Class I Areas

As required by the Clean Air Act, the five national parks that were in existence in Utah in 1977 are
mandatory Class I areas.
Arches National Park
Bryce Canyon National Park
Canyonlands National Park
Capitol Reef National Park
Zion National Park
Class I areas are given the greatest degree of protection under the Clean Air Act. In addition, these areas
are the focus for visibility concerns, as outlined in Section XVII of this State Implementation Plan.

2.

Class II Areas

All other areas in the state are currently classified as Class II areas. Industrial growth is allowed in these
areas, but in many parts of the state where the air is exceptionally clean, the air quality will not be
allowed to degrade to the level of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards.

3.

Class III Areas

The remaining designation of Class III could be used for more industrial areas. Greater growth is allowed
in these areas, although in all cases the National Ambient Air Quality Standards must still be met. There
are currently no areas in Utah that have been designated Class III.

C.

AREA REDESIGNATIONS

The State of Utah may change the classification of areas within the state. However, there are some
limitations in the Clean Air Act that must be considered when reclassifying areas.
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1.

Restrictions on Redesignation.
a. In accordance with Section 162(a) of the federal Clean Air Act, mandatory Class I areas may
not be redesignated. There are five mandatory Class 1 areas in Utah: Arches National Park,
Bryce Canyon National Park, Canyonlands National Park, Capitol Reef National Park, and Zion
National Park.
b. In accordance with Section 164(a) of the federal Clean Air Act, the following areas may be
redesignated only as Class I or II.
(1) An area which as of August 7, 1977, exceeded 10,000 acres in size and was a national
monument, a national primitive area, a national preserve, a national recreation area, a national
wild and scenic river, a national wildlife refuge, a national lakeshore or seashore; and
(2) A national park or national wilderness area established after August 7, 1977, which
exceeds 10,000 acres in size.
c. Lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian Tribes may
be redesignated only by the appropriate Indian body as provided in Section 164 of the Clean Air
Act.

2.

Analysis of Proposal.

Before proposing a change in classification, Section 164 of the federal Clean Air Act requires the State to
prepare information about the proposal. The executive secretary will prepare a discussion of the reasons
for the proposed redesignation, including a satisfactory description and analysis of the health,
environmental, economic and social and energy effects of the proposed redesignation. Any person who
petitions the Board for redesignation of an area is required to prepare and submit this analysis to the
Board in accordance with R307-405-5.
Before proposing to redesignate an area to Class III, the following additional information is required:
a. documentation that the redesignation will not cause, or contribute to, concentrations of any air
pollutant which would exceed any maximum allowable increase permitted under the classification
of any other area or any national ambient air quality standard; and
b. the permit application for any major source or major modification (as defined in R307-405)
that could receive a PSD permit only if the area in question were redesignated as Class III, and
any material submitted as part of that application, insofar as practicable.

3.

Consultation with Local Governments

Before the Board proposes the redesignation of any area, the executive secretary will consult with the
elected leadership of local and other substate general purpose governments in the area covered by the
proposed redesignation.
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4.

Public Comment

The Board will provide an opportunity for public comment on the proposed reclassification and
supporting documentation.
a. Notice will be published in newspapers of general circulation in the affected area and written
notice will be made to local government units, other states, Indian governing bodies and Federal
Land Managers whose lands may be affected by the proposed redesignation. Such notice will be
made at least 30 days prior to the public hearing and include a statement of the availability of the
information described in Section C.3 above.
b. At least one public hearing will be conducted in the affected areas in accordance with the
procedures established in 40 CFR 51.102.
c. Prior to the issuance of notice respecting the redesignation of any Federal lands, written notice
will be provided to the appropriate Federal Land Manager who will be afforded adequate
opportunity (not in excess of 60 days) to confer with the State respecting the redesignation and to
submit written comments and recommendations. In recommending redesignation of any area
with respect to which a Federal Land Manager has submitted comments, the Board will publish a
list of any inconsistency between such redesignation and such comments and recommendations
(together with the reasons for recommending such redesignation against the recommendation of
the Federal Land Manager).

5.

Additional Requirements for Redesignating Areas to Class III

If the Board is proposing to redesignate an area of the state to Class III, section 164 of the Clean Air Act
requires additional consultation and approval. The State of Utah will ensure that the following actions
have occurred before redesignating any area to Class III.
a. The proposed redesignation has been specifically approved by the Governor after consultation
with appropriate committees of the Legislature, if it is in session, or with the leadership of the
Legislature, if it is not in session.
b. Units of local government representing a majority of the residents of the proposed area to be
redesignated have enacted ordinances concurring in the redesignation.

6.

Submittal

The State of Utah will submit the redesignation to the EPA Administrator as a revision to the State
Implementation Plan.

D. PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW AND
MODIFIED SOURCES
R307-405 establishes the permitting requirements for new major sources or major modifications in
attainment or unclassified areas of the state as required by 40 CFR 51.166.
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1.

Impact Analysis

An applicant for a PSD permit is required to conduct an air quality analysis of the ambient impacts
associated with the construction and operation of the proposed new source or modification. The main
purpose of the air quality analysis is to demonstrate that new emissions emitted from a proposed major
stationary source or major modification, in conjunction with other applicable emissions from existing
sources (including secondary emissions from growth associated with the new project), will not cause or
contribute to a violation of any national ambient air quality standard or PSD increment. Ambient air
monitoring may be required before and after construction of the source to ensure that the modeled results
are accurate.

2.

Best Available Control Technology

Utah's PSD program requires all new major sources and major modifications in PSD areas to use the best
available control technology that would yield the highest air cleaning efficiencies and the lowest pollution
discharges. Over time, it is expected that older sources will upgrade their operations to become more
efficient and competitive in the marketplace and under the PSD program these sources are also required to
upgrade their pollution controls as part of the modification. The program has been successful in Utah,
and the number of sources considered "grandfathered" and operating under pre-1977 emission limitations
continues to decrease.

3.

Additional Impact Analysis

The air quality impact assessment of PSD sources goes beyond measuring the impact of new sources on
the NAAQS and PSD increment. The permit applicant must prepare additional impact analyses to assess
the impacts of air, ground, and water pollution on soils, vegetation and visibility caused by the new
source and any associated growth. Class I areas require additional scrutiny to ensure that the air quality
related values that are important to each protected area are not adversely affected by the new source.

4.

Minor Source Permitting Program

In addition to the PSD permitting program, Utah also requires new minor sources and minor
modifications to all sources to apply best available control technology. R307-410 establishes modeling
requirements to ensure that minor sources and modifications will not cause or contribute to a violation of
the NAAQS.

E.

Increment Violations

Where the Board determines that an increment established under R307-405-6 is violated, the Board will
promulgate a plan and implement rules to eliminate the violation

F.

Emission Inventories for Increment Tracking.

An initial emissions inventory tracking system for increment consumption has been developed for
existing major sources approved since the minor source baseline dates were established. The tracking
system will be maintained for all pollutants having increments.
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